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This Article describes briefly the way in which the system now operates and the major com-
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INTRODUCTION
The dispute settlement system established by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' ("GATT") is one of its more
controversial aspects. A major goal of the United States in the
recently commenced Uruguay Round of trade negotiations is
to improve the functioning of that system.2 This Article de-
scribes briefly the way in which the system now operates and
the major complaints that have been lodged against it. These
complaints, many of which originated prior to the Tokyo
Round of trade negotiations in the 1970s,' are analyzed in
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is attached to the Final Act of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, which was signed in Ge-
neva, Switzerland, on October 30, 1947. It is in force by virtue of the Protocol of
Provisional Application, signed by the original parties to GATT, and the subsequent
accession protocols signed by new members. 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT]. The text of the agreement as amended to date
was published in 1969 by GATT as Volume 4 of its collection of BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMErs [hereinafter BISD]. The term "General Agreement" is
used herein to refer only to the General Agreement itself. The term "GATT" is used
herein to refer to the GATT trading system as an institution and as a system includ-
ing the General Agreement and the various side agreements to it that were con-
cluded in 1979 in the Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations. Those side agreements,
which were published in BISD (26th Supp. 1980), are applicable only to those parties
subscribing to them.
Ninety-four nations are contracting parties to the General Agreement, including
virtually all major trading nations except the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and
the People's Republic of China. The latter is currently negotiating for membership.
In addition, another thirty or so countries apply it on a de facto basis. As a conse-
quence, the vast majority of world trade takes place under the auspices of GATT.
The leading treatise on GATT is J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT (1969). See also K. DAM, THE GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR-
GANIZATION (1969); R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLO-
MACY (1975). For more recent works, see E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REG-
ULATION (2d ed. 1986); Davey, GA TT: Its Present Operation and Prospects for Its Future, in
PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
IN 1986, at 2-1 U. Moss ed. 1986).
2. See, e.g., Omnibus Trade Act of 1987, S. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 105(b)(2)(A) (1987). The Uruguay Round is the eighth general round of trade ne-
gotiations held under the auspices of GATT. It was officially launched in September
1986 at Punta del Esta, Uruguay. GATT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay
Round, reprinted in GATT Focus, No. 41 (Oct. 1986) and 25 I.L.M. 1623 (1986). One
of the negotiating subgroups of the Goods Negotiating Group is considering reforms
to the dispute settlement system. See GATT Focus, Nos. 46 & 47 (May &June 1987).
3. The Tokyo Round, also known as the Multilateral Trade Negotiations or the
MTN, was the seventh general round of trade negotiations sponsored by GATT. It
resulted in lower tariffs and a series of side agreements that interpreted and ex-
panded the coverage of the General Agreement in respect of such topics as customs
valuation, government procurement, technical barriers to trade, subsidies, and an-
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light of GATT's post-Tokyo Round experience in resolving
trade disputes. This analysis demonstrates that the GATT dis-
pute settlement system has been reasonably successful in
resolving recent trade disputes.
The system is far from perfect, however, and this Article
makes a number of suggestions for improvements. These sug-
gestions are based on the conclusion that a more "legalistic"
or rule-oriented approach to dispute settlement would im-
prove the effectiveness of the GATT system. In particular, it is
argued that such an approach better promotes general adher-
ence to GATT's rules and principles than does GATT's cur-
rent negotiation or consensus approach to dispute settlement.
Proposals made in this article for reform of the operation of
the dispute settlement system would provide for strict limita-
tions on the existing right of one party to block adoption of
dispute settlement panel decisions, increased use of retaliatory
measures under the authority and control of GATT and the
formation of a "superpanel" of GATT experts to serve on
panels.
I. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE GATT
TRADING SYSTEM
The basic goal of GATT is to promote free international
trade by establishing rules that limit national impediments to
trade.4 While freer trade is usually considered to be in the
overall interest of a nation, particular economic sectors may be
adversely affected by the resulting increase in foreign competi-
tion. Not infrequently these sectors have sufficient political
power to obtain special favors from their national government
tidumping and countervailing duties. See generally GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1979).
4. GATT, supra note 1, preamble, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A 1l, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at
7, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 194-96. GAT seeks to accomplish its goal by (1) encouraging
parties to set maximum tariff rates, see id. art. II, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) AS, A14-A17, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, at 10-13, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 200-04, and sponsoring periodic rounds of
tariff negotiations to reduce those maximum rates; (2) banning quotas, id. art. XI, 61
Stat. (pt. 5) AS, A32-A34, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 28-30, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 224-28; and
(3) requiring most-favored-nation, id. art. 1, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) AS, A12-AI3, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, at 8-9, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 196-200, and national, id. art. II, 61 Stat. (pt. 5)
AS, AI4-A17, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 10-13, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 200-04, treatment to be
given to imports.
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to protect themselves from such competition." Consequently,
disputes under the General Agreement usually involve one
GATT member protesting measures taken by another to pro-
vide certain of its industries with special protection or advan-
tages that interfere with international trade.
The General Agreement contains many provisions
designed to resolve trade disputes between its contracting par-
ties.6 Most of them provide initially, and sometimes exclu-
sively, for consultations between the contending parties. 7  If
the parties are unable to settle their differences through nego-
tiations, however, they may resort to GATT Article XXIII,
which is GATT's basic dispute settlement mechanism. 8
5. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 17 (2d ed. 1986).
6. J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 164-66.
7. See, e.g, GATT, supra note 1, art. VII:I, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A25-A26, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, at 21-22, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 216; art. VIII:2, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A28-A29,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 24-25, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 220; art. XIX:2, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3,
A58, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 55, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 260; art. XXII, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3,
A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 60, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 266. Other provisions of the General
Agreement that may play a role in dispute settlement include those allowing for
waiver of obligations, id. art. XXV:5, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A68-A69, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
at 64-65, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 272-74, and periodic renegotiation of concessions, id. art.
XXVIII:1, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A71, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 67, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 276-78.
8. The text of Article XXIII is as follows:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or
that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as
the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations
under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the
matter, make written representations or proposals to the other contracting
party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party
thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations
or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties
concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type de-
scribed in paragraph 1(c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appro-
priate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be
concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The CON-
TRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the Eco-
nomic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate
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Article XXIII may be invoked, inter alia, when one GATT
member claims that a benefit accruing to it under the General
Agreement has been nullified or impaired by another member
so that it has suffered some detriment.9 In such a case, the
contracting parties, acting as a group,' 0 are required to investi-
gate the matter and make appropriate recommendations or
rulings.' If the contracting parties find that the circumstances
are serious enough, they may authorize the complainant to
take retaliatory action against the respondent to compensate
the complainant for its damages.' 2
The scope of Article XXIII is extremely broad. Under Ar-
inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider such consulta-
tion necessary. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circum-
stances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a con-
tracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting
party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agree-
ment as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the appli-
cation to any contracting party of any concession or other obligation is in
fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty
days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secre-
tary to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from this
Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day fol-
lowing the day on which such notice is received by him.
GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A64-A65, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at
60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 266-68. The signatory members of GATT are cumulatively
referred to in the General Agreement as the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
9. Id. art. XXIII:I, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 60, 55 U.N.T.S.
188, 266-68. It may also be invoked if the attainment of any objective of the Agree-
ment is being impeded. Id.
10. GATT was never intended to be an independent international organization.
It was expected that it would be subsumed under the umbrella of the International
Trade Organization, which unfortunately never came into existence because the U.S.
Congress failed to ratify it. Consequently, the General Agreement does not provide
an organizational structure for GATr except by specifying that all of the contracting
parties may in certain circumstances meet and take action. J. JACKSON, supra note 1,
ch. 2. The contracting parties typically meet towards the end of each year. In order
to deal with matters arising between these annual meetings, the GATT Council was
created. It meets more or less monthly and is open to all contracting parties willing
to participate. It has been delegated all of the powers of the contracting parties,
except the power to grant waivers. Its decisions may be appealed to the contracting
parties, acting as a group. BISD, supra note 1, at 9 (9th Supp. 1961). Although no
provision is made for it in the General Agreement, a GATT Secretariat exists and
now comprises several hundred persons. It is headed by a Director-General. Tech-
nically, the staff is employed by the Interim Commission of the defunct International
Trade Organization.
11. GATT, supra note I, art. XXIII:2, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A64-A65, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, at 60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 268.
12. Id.
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ticle XXIII, one party's benefits may be nullified or impaired
by another party's violation of the General Agreement but also
by "any measure" taken by another party, even if not in viola-
tion of the General Agreement.' 3 The precise limits of Article
XXIII obviously depend on how the term "benefit" is defined.
Most disputes in GATT have involved alleged violations of the
General Agreement, where the complaining party has con-
tended that the benefit impaired or nullified is its expectancy
of the other party's compliance with the General Agreement.
Early decisions established, however, that the term "benefit"
could have a much more expansive meaning. For example,
nullification and impairment were found in one case when a
national subsidy program for fertilizer was revised so that cer-
tain imported fertilizer was no longer given the same,
favorable treatment afforded to a competing variety of domes-
tically produced fertilizer. The dispute settlement panel ruled
that the GATT benefit nullified or impaired was the com-
plaining party's reasonable expectation that its fertilizer prod-
uct and the product produced in the respondent country
would continue to be treated the same.' 4 As a result of this
and several similar decisions,'- one party may be entitled to
compensation even though its detriment flowed only from dis-
appointed expectations, and the other party did not violate the
General Agreement.
This broad view of Article XXIII's scope may be explained
by the divergent functions that the drafters of the General
Agreement apparently wanted it to fulfill. On the one hand,
they wanted a procedure for adjudicating claims that the Gen-
eral Agreement had been violated and providing for appropri-
ate redress; on the other hand, they also wanted a sort of
mandatory renegotiation procedure for settling more general
13. See id., art. XXIII:I(b), 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 60, 55
U.N.T.S. 188, 266-68. It may also be caused by the "existence of any other situa-
tion." Id. art. XXIII:I(c), 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 60, 55
U.N.T.S. 188, 266-68.
14. The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, BISD, supra note 1, at 188
(1952).
15. GAIT, Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, BISD, supra note 1,
at 53 (1st Supp. 1952); GATT Panel Report or. EC Subsidies on Raisins and Canned
Fruit, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. Export Weekly (BNA) 1028 (1984) (report not adopted); cf.
GATT, United States Manufacturing Clause, BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 83, 89 (3 1st
Supp. 1985).
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grievances, applicable when one party had somehow impinged
on another's interests or when the balance of concessions
needed adjusting, even in the absence of a violation of the
agreement.' 6 Thus, Article XXIII was originally intended to
be more than simply a rule-enforcing provision. Since most
disputes concern alleged violations of rules, this article will fo-
cus on the rule-enforcement aspect of Article XXIII. It is im-
portant to bear in mind, however, that Article XXIII has this
balancing aspect in cases not involving violations of rules, as it
may color views of whether Article XXIII should be strength-
ened.' 7
Article XXIII only outlines how disputes are to be
processed in the GATT system; it does not establish any for-
mal procedures for handling them. From the outset it was evi-
dent that a general meeting of all contracting parties would be
ill-suited to consider disputes. Although the procedures actu-
ally used have varied somewhat over the years, it has become
the standard practice for the contracting parties to appoint a
panel of individuals to consider a dispute and prepare a report
so that the contracting parties can take appropriate action.',
By the early 1970s, there were increased complaints about
many aspects of the panel process and a general disagreement
among GATT members over whether the principal role of
GATT dispute settlement panels should be to render judicial-
like decisions or to promote negotiated settlements through
conciliation.' 9 As a result of these concerns, the dispute settle-
16. See generally J. JACKsoN, supra note 1, at 169-71.
17. In response to concern over this balancing aspect of Article XXIII, the 1982
Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement provided: "It is understood that deci-
sions in [the dispute settlement] process cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the General Agreement." GATr, Ministerial Declaration,
Dispute Settlement Procedures, BISD, supra note 1, at 13, 16 (29th Supp. 1983)
[hereinafter 1982 Declaration].
18. See generally R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 66-83. Initially, disputes were consid-
ered by working parties, consisting of the contending nations and several other
GATT members. Working party reports typically stated the views of each member of
the working party and did not reach decisions on the merits of the dispute, although
the views of the majority were often evident and over time the reports were often
treated as having reached definitive decisions. d. In the early 1950s, use of panels
became the standard practice in Article XXIII cases. The operation of panels is de-
scribed in the text accompanying infra notes 20-30.
19. For a description of the problems of the panel system as of the mid-1970s,
see R. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DIsPuTEs 11-23 (1978).
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ment system was the subject of extensive discussion in the To-
kyo Round, which led to the adoption of an Understanding on
Dispute Settlement at the conclusion of that Round.2" The
Understanding mainly summarized the dispute settlement pro-
cedures that had traditionally been used in GATT and indi-
cated that they would continue to be used.2 ' Despite contin-
ued dissatisfaction with the operation of the panel process, a
1982 GATT Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement
largely reiterated the 1979 decision.2
As a result of these actions, the dispute settlement system
as it currently operates can be summarized as follows: Follow-
ing the inability of two contracting parties to resolve a dispute
through consultations and negotiations, the aggrieved party
may request the appointment of a panel to adjudicate the dis-
pute. The request is made to the GATT Council, a body open
to all GATT members, which meets every month or so and
which has been delegated the authority to act on behalf of the
contracting parties as a whole.23 There is no absolute right to
have a panel appointed. Indeed, the respondent is given the
right to answer the complaint made and may argue that the
appointment of a panel would be premature or otherwise inap-
propriate. 4 In fact, panels are virtually always established if
requested, assuming the request is vigorously pursued. 5
There may be considerable delay between the initial request
and the establishment of a panel, however, and it is under-
stood that the appointment of a panel might in some cases be
20. GATT, Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Set-
tlement and Surveillance, BISD, supra note 1, at 210 (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter
1979 Understanding]; see also GATT, supra note 3, at 104-07, 151-51.
21. Although the 1979 Understanding made no significant changes in GATT
dispute settlement procedures (except for specifying certain time limits in which vari-
ous actions ought to be taken), it was viewed as noteworthy because it indicated that
the contracting parties were willing to continue the system as it had developed.
Given the system's problems, the negotiations might well have left it in a more weak-
ened state. See Hudec, GAT' Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished
Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 158-59 (1980).
22. 1982 Declaration, supra note 17.
23. See supra note 10.
24. 1979 Understanding, supra note 20, 10.
25. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1793, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GATT AND THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS
57 (1985) [hereinafter ITC DISPUTE SETrLEMENT STUDY] (Report to the Committee
on Finance, U.S. Senate, on Investigation No. 332-212 under Section 332(g) of the
Tariff Act of 1930).
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inappropriate because any decision that the panel could con-
ceivably reach would be fruitless.2 6
Additional delay in the appointment of a panel may occur
after a decision has been made to proceed because it is also
understood that the contending parties have a right to be con-
sulted on the composition of the panel and to reject panel
members whom they consider objectionable. 7 Pursuant to the
Understanding, parties are required to object within seven
days of the Director General's 28 nomination of a panel member
and it is understood that they should do so then only for com-
pelling reasons. 29 The panel members are typically national
officials responsible for GATT and international trade matters,
particularly those based in Geneva who represent their coun-
tries at GATT.30 In principle, panel members are to act as in-
dividuals, and not as representatives of their own countries' in-
terests, in reaching their decisions.
Once the panel has been appointed, its task is typically to
examine the dispute and make such findings as will assist the
contracting parties in making recommendations or rulings as
provided for in Article XXIII. 3 ' The panel receives written
and/or oral submissions from the contending parties and may
receive submissions from other interested parties. It then is-
sues a proposed report on which the contending parties com-
ment. Following its consideration of the comments, the panel
submits its report to the GATT Council. The report normally
resolves the major disputed issues raised by the contending
parties (or at least those necessary to reach a decision) and, if
nullification or impairment is found, recommends, in order of
preference: that the offending measure be removed; or, if that
26. "Before bringing a case, contracting parties have exercised their judgment
as to whether action under Article XXIII:2 would be fruitful." 1979 Understanding,
supra note 20, Annex 4 (Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT
in the Field of Dispute Settlement (Article XXXII:2)) .
27. Id. 11.
28. See supra note 10.
29. See 1979 Understanding, supra note 20, Annex 12.
30. Occasionally, independent experts on GATF law or retired GATT officials
serve on panels. There is, however, a stated preference for use of national officials,
although in 1984 it was agreed that it would be appropriate to use nongovernmental
panelists to break deadlocks over panel composition. GAFF, Action by Contracting
Parties on Dispute Settlement Procedures, BISD, supra note 1, at 9-10 (31st Supp.
1985).
31. Panel procedures are summarized in the 1979 Understanding, supra note 20.
19871
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is not possible, that the injured party be compensated; or, as a
last resort, that the injured party be authorized to retaliate
against the offending party.3 2 Retaliation, however, has been
authorized only once under Article XXIII, 35 years ago. 3
Throughout the panel procedure, the disputants are urged to
resolve the matter amicably. 4
A panel report in and of itself has no force. It must first be
adopted by the Council on behalf of the contracting parties.
Although the issues discussed in the report are not relitigated
in the Council, the Council does not usually act absent consen-
sus.3 5 Thus, the "losing" party (at least an important losing
party) may hold up adoption of a panel report interminably
while it purports to analyze it and to explore possible negoti-
ated solutions with the prevailing party.3 6
Each of the Tokyo Round agreements" has a provision on
dispute settlement. Generally, these provisions either incorpo-
rate or closely follow the procedures described above. The
main differences are that there is usually an unqualified right
to have a panel appointed under the agreements, time limits
for completion of certain stages are sometimes stricter and
more precisely defined, and the panel report is adopted (or
not) by the appropriate agreement's committee of signato-
ries.38
32. 1979 Understanding, supra note 20, Annex, 4.
33. GATT, Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United
States, BISD, supra note 1, at 32 (1st Supp. 1953); see also id. at 62.
34. See, e.g., 1979 Understanding, supra note 20, 16, 18.
35. Although the General Agreement establishes a one-nation/one-vote system,
GAIT, supra note 1, art. XXV:3, it has traditionally operated on the basis of consen-
sus. Thus, if any contracting party is strongly opposed to a proposed GATT action,
that action will not be taken. See E. McGOVERN, supra note 1, at 24.
36. ITC DISPUTE SETrLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 58-61. The 1982 Ministe-
rial Declaration stated, "The Contracting Parties reaffirmed that consensus will con-
tinue to be the traditional method of resolving disputes; however, they agreed that
obstruction in the process of dispute settlement shall be avoided." 1982 Declaration,
supra note 17, 10.
37. See supra note 3.
38. This article will not separately consider the dispute settlement procedures
under the Tokyo Round codes except where they are particularly relevant to the mat-
ter under discussion. For analyses of the differences in the procedures adopted in
those codes, see Hudec, supra note 21, at 174-77; see also Jackson, The Birth of the
GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 21, 44-47
(1980).
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II. CRITICS AND THE GATT DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
The basic structure and operating procedures of the
GAIT dispute settlement system have not changed greatly
since the early 1950s. Nonetheless, perceptions of the sys-
tem's effectiveness and usefulness have varied widely over the
years. It was generally viewed as effective during the first dec-
ade of GATT's existence, but during the ensuing twenty years,
its reputation declined significantly.3 9 As to the past decade,
the jury is still out. This section of the article briefly reviews
the operation of the system during its first two historical
phases and considers the factors that made it a success in its
first period and a failure in its second. It then turns to a more
detailed analysis of the principal attacks that have been made
against the system and considers their validity in light of the
operation of the system over the last decade. Particular atten-
tion is given to the contention that use of Article XXIII as an
adjudicatory dispute settlement system is fundamentally incon-
sistent with the basic nature of GAIT, which it is claimed can
operate effectively only by voluntary consensus -arrived at
through negotiation.
A. Historical Overview
During its first decade-1948 to 1958-the GATT dispute
settlement system was perceived to have worked well. There
were a fair number of cases considered per year (three to
five)40 and the vast majority of cases were resolved satisfacto-
rily.4 ' This success can be attributed to a number of factors.
39. The first two phases are comprehensively analyzed by Professor Hudec, the
leading scholar of GATT dispute settlement, in R. HUDEC, supra note 1.
40. Calculating the precise number of disputes is difficult. There are obviously
disputes that occur but do not ultimately result in panel reports. Most lists of dis-
putes include some complaints that do not result in the formation of a panel, but
there is disagreement over what constitutes a complaint. For example, Hudec lists
seventy-seven disputes through 1974. R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 275-96. The U.S.
International Trade Commission study lists forty-two, ITC DISPUTE SETrLEMENT
STUDY, supra note 25, at 1-5 to 1-15; and a private GAIT Compilation lists forty-four.
These differences, plus the difficulties in assessing the result of invoking the dispute
settlement system, make precise statistical statements about the system inherently
misleading. It is possible, however, to note general trends.
41. Measuring the system's success is also problematic. The necessary informa-
tion is often not publicly available, and it is difficult to gauge a complainant's "satis-
faction" in any event. The most careful analysis of this period is by Professor Hudec.
1987]
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First, the General Agreement had only recently been negoti-
ated and there was a general consensus on what it meant and
how it should be interpreted.4 2 Second, the number of GATT
members was relatively small and their backgrounds and inter-
ests were relatively similar.43 Moreover, many of the officials
dealing with GATT matters during this period had personally
participated in its creation and presumably thus had a greater
stake in making it succeed. 4" The system's success in its early
years should not be overestimated, however. Some disputes
were resolved only after several years had passed.45
Futhermore, a careful examination of that period reveals that
the GATT participants were concerned with GATT's fragility
and took care not to put too much stress on it through overly
aggressive use of the dispute settlement system.46 Even with
these qualifications, however, it can be said that the system
worked well.
As time passed and GATT membership grew, and as the
world economy expanded rapidly, the factors that had resulted
in successful dispute settlement during the 1950s inevitably di-
minished in importance. From 1959 through 1978, the GATT
dispute settlement system fell into disrepute and disuse, and
certain nations considered their experience with the system to
be unsatisfactory.47 It was invoked on average only about once
He concludes that of the forty complaints filed during the period 1952-1958, thirty
resulted in a settlement apparently satisfactory to the complainant, four complainants
disappeared and one complainant lost. Only five resulted in an impasse. R. HuDEC,
supra note 1, at 95. Of the satisfactory settlements, three were compromises that did
not implement the basic legal claim. Id. The study by the U.S. International Trade
Commission suggests a greater rate of success. ITC DisPenUE SETTLEMENT STUDY,
supra note 25, at 62. It does not, however, consider any of Hudec's five impasse
cases. Compare R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 84 n.3 with ITC DISPUTE SETrLEMENT
STUDY, supra note 25, at 1-3 to 1-4.
42. R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 14-21.
43. Id. at 14, 21-23.
44. See R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 187-88.
45. See, e.g., GATT, Brazilian Internal Taxes, BISD, supra note 1, at 181, 186
(1952); BISD, supra note 1, at 25 (2d Supp. 1954); BISD, supra note 1, at 21 (4th
Supp. 1956).
46. See R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 190.
47. Three cases stand out in particular. The first involved U.S. and EC tax sys-
tems that allegedly favored exports. It is described infra in the text accompanying
notes 54-58.
In addition, in 1962 Uruguay filed a complaint against fifteen developed coun-
tries attacking numerous nontariff barriers that allegedly impeded Uruguayan ex-
ports. Uruguay did not contend that all of the barriers were illegal, but that as a
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per year,48 with a majority of the complaints having been
brought by the United States.4 9 A number of explanations
have been offered for the decline in use. First, the formation
and expansion of the European Community ("EC") diverted
the attention of most European countries, which had previ-
ously been active in using the dispute settlement system. With
the advent of the EC, disputes between EC members were set-
tled within the EC institutions. 50 Second, because certain pro-
visions of the General Agreement-especially in respect of ag-
riculture, textiles and safeguards (voluntary export re-
straints)-were not strictly enforced, a feeling developed
among some contracting parties that no GAIT provisions
should be strictly enforced. In lieu of such enforcement, it was
argued that trade disputes should be settled by negotiations,
and that the provisions of the General Agreement should not
necessarily be determinative of the outcome of the negotia-
tions. Reliance on the dispute settlement mechanism was con-
result of their existence Uruguayan benefits under the General Agreement had been
nullified and impaired. Uruguay declined to support its claims with statistical data or
otherwise participate in the prosecution of the case. In essence, the complaint was a
demand that GATT enforce its rules more strictly and give more consideration to the
.problems of developing countries. Ultimately, the panel considering the complaint
refused to go forward without Uruguay's participation, although those respondents
who admitted violating the General Agreement received recommendations to stop.
See GATT, Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, BISD, supra note 1, at 95 (11 th
Supp. 1963); BISD, supra note 1, at 35, 45 (13th Supp. 1965). The Uruguayan com-
plaint caused many GATT members to want the dispute settlement system de-em-
phasized. The GATT members thought the system was too easily abused by those
relying inappropriately on legalistic arguments in situations where negotiations were
the only appropriate remedy. See R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 220-23.
In the so-called Chicken War, the United States and the EC disagreed over the
amount of compensation owed to the United States when the U.S. share of the EC
chicken market declined as a result of the implementation of certain EC agricultural
policies. Although GATT ultimately played a useful role in fixing the amount of
compensation, it was felt by many that the dispute itself was one that demonstrated
the inefficacy of dispute settlement by adjudicatory proceedings, especially because
the dispute occurred during and jeopardized progress in the Kennedy Round. See id.
at 219-20, 222-23.
48. ITC DisPtrrE SETrLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 1-11 to 1-18.
49. The U.S. complaints tended to be brought in bunches, usually at times when
the Executive Branch wanted to demonstrate to Congress that it was actively protect-
ing U.S. interests so that Congress would pass trade legislation desired by the Execu-
tive Branch. R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 230-31.
50. Id. at 216-17. In addition to the formation of the EC, the membership of
GAIT changed radically in this period as more and more developing countries
joined. R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 21-23.
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sequently viewed as inappropriate. 5' Third, the emergence of
Japan and the European Community as economic superpowers
changed GATT from an organization dominated by the United
States into one in which there were three recognizable power
centers. These new economic powers did not necessarily view
a formal dispute settlement system to be in their interests. 52
Their newly acquired economic strength made them more in-
terested in negotiating solutions to disputes, a method they
viewed as enabling them better to protect their interests.53
They no longer needed a rule-based system to protect them-
selves from the United States.
During this second period, the reputation of the dispute
settlement system also declined. It was perceived to be ineffec-
tive, a conclusion buttressed by the major case of the 1970s,
the so-called DISC case, in which the EC alleged that certain
U.S. tax legislation amounted to an export subsidy.5 4 In re-
sponse, the United States counterclaimed that several EC
member state tax systems were also operated as export subsi-
dies.55 The conduct of the combined cases epitomized the
shortcomings of the dispute settlement system; it took almost
three years to appoint the panel and, when the panel upheld
both claims in 1976, many felt that it had reached the wrong
result.56 Furthermore, implementation of the decision was un-
satisfactory. The panel report was not adopted by the Council
until 1981 and then only subject to qualifications.5 7 The Euro-
pean tax systems remained in place, although the U.S. DISC
legislation was effectively replaced in 1984.58
Consequently, prior to and during the Tokyo Round ne-
gotiations, there was much dissatisfaction with the GATT dis-
51. R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 14-2 1.
52. Id. at 21.
53. Id. at 22.
54. GATT, United States Tax Legislation, BISD, supra note 1, at 98 (23d Supp.
1977). The DISC case was exhaustively analyzed in Jackson, The Jurisprudence ofInter-
national Trade. The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM.J. INT'L L. 747 (1978).
55. See GATT, Income Tax Practices Maintained by France, BISD, supra note 1,
at 114 (23d Supp. 1977); GATT, Income Tax Practices Maintained by Belgium,
BISD, supra note 1, at 127 (23d Supp. 1977); GATT, Income Tax Practices Main-
tained by the Netherlands, BISD, supra note I, at 137 (23d Supp. 1977).
56. See Jackson, supra note 54, at 779-81.
57. GATT, Tax Legislation, BISD, supra note 1, at 114 (28th Supp. 1982).
58. The DISC legislation was replaced in 1984 by legislation authorizing For-
eign Sales Corporations. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-927 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
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pute settlement system. This sentiment was particularly evi-
dent in the United States, where Congressional committees
complained that the system's ineffectiveness prevented the
United States from enforcing its rights under GATT, thereby
indirectly suggesting that perhaps the United States should not
participate in GATT.59 Among the many criticisms leveled at
the system, the principal charges were that the system:
a) was inappropriate and ill-conceived because it stressed
judicial solutions to problems that were really resolvable
only through negotiations;
b) had become irrelevant because it was not used, except
occasionally by the United States, and it was impractical
to expand its usage;
c) was inefficient because of long delays; and
d) was ineffective because of its inability to ensure imple-
mentation of its decisions.
The first of these criticisms is philosophical in nature:
How should GAIT approach dispute settlement? Should
third parties issue rulings on whether countries have violated
the General Agreement or should they limit their role to con-
ciliation? The other criticisms focus on operational aspects of
the system: Who uses it? How long does it take? What results
are produced? These criticisms will be analyzed in light of
post-Tokyo Round experiences with the system. It appears
that at least some of the criticisms of the past are no longer
valid and that the current-third-phase of the dispute settle-
ment system's history has been relatively successful.
B. The Philosophical Debate: Adjudication or Negotiation?
As it has operated over the years, the GATT dispute set-
tlement system has resembled a judicial system in important
aspects: neutral decision-makers have determined whether a
contracting party has violated the General Agreement and
have usually recommended that the violation be terminated.
Critics of the system have argued that it should be made more
judicial so as to promote more precise decisions on the merits
of disputes and more effective implementation of decisions.6"
59. See H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1973).
60. See, e.g. ,Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Propo-
sal in the Context of GATT, 13J. WORLD TRADE L. 1 (1979).
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At the same time, other critics have argued that the nature and
basic philosophy of GATT dictate that the system should be
used only to the extent it facilitates negotiated settlements of
trade disputes. The decline in the use of the system in the
1960s and the 1970s probably reflects the influence of these
latter critics since their position has been subscribed to by
some leading GATT officials and parties.6'
These two conflicting viewpoints on how the GATT dis-
pute settlement system should operate are often referred to,
on the one hand, as the "legalistic" model, which stresses adju-
dication, and, on the other, the "antilegalistic" model, which
emphasizes negotiation and consensus.6 2 Put simply, the le-
galistic view is that the General Agreement is a code of con-
duct and embodies a balance of concessions. If a contracting
party violates the code and tips the balance, it is appropriate to
label that party as a violator and to put pressure on it to con-
form its conduct to the code, if necessary by threatening some
form of retaliation. On the other hand, the antilegalistic posi-
tion is that.the General Agreement is not a code of conduct per
se, but more of a commitment by the contracting parties to deal
in good faith with each other in trade matters so as to work out
a mutually acceptable solution to any disagreement.6" The
United States is generally perceived to support the legalistic
position, while the EC and Japan are considered supporters of
the antilegalistic view.6 4 Most non-European developed coun-
tries and many developing countries have tended to support
the legalistic view since they see it as a more effective protector
of small-country rights.65 In part, these divergences in ap-
proach between the United States, the EC and Japan can be
explained by different domestic traditions in respect of dispute
61. See, e.g., 0. LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMIrATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL
TRADE SYSTEM (1985) (Mr. Long was Director-General of GATT from 1968 to 1980);
Phan van Phi, A European View of the GA7T, 14 IrN'L Bus. LAw. 150 (1986) (Mr. Phan
van Phi was formerly in charge of GAIT relations for the EC).
62. ITC DISPUTE SETrLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 68. Another way of view-
ing the difference is to ask whether the system should be juridical or diplomatic in
character. See GATT Focus, No. 47, at 2 (June 1987).
63. See ITC DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 68.
64. Id.
65. Id. For example, Brazil proposed in the Tokyo Round that the dispute set-
tlement be strengthened by making the developed countries subject to sanctions for
illegal trade actions taken against developing countries. GATT, supra note 3, at 96-
106; Hudec, supra note 21, at 157-58.
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settlement-the United States is a more litigious society than
Japan, which places a high premium on consensus. 66 The dif-
ferent positions may also be the result of a country's percep-
tion as to which approach will best serve its interests. 67
The text of Article XXIII does not clearly mandate adop-
tion of either the legalist or antilegalist position, although the
authorization to the contracting parties to make rulings and to
permit retaliation certainly suggests that GATT was intended
to do more than simply provide conciliation services.68 That
GATT was to encompass a legalistic role is also borne out by
the early history of the dispute settlement system.69 In any
event, the basic questions to be considered today are: What
are the goals of the GATT dispute settlement system, and
would they be better achieved by emphasizing adjudication or
negotiation?
1. Goals of GATT Dispute Settlement
The GATT dispute settlement system was intended to re-
solve two types of disputes that may arise among GATT mem-
bers: first, claims by one party that another has violated the
provisions of the General Agreement; and second, objections
by one party to practices of another that are not prohibited by
the General Agreement, but that nonetheless have an adverse
effect on the objecting party.70 These types of disputes are
quite different, and the role of the dispute settlement system
changes, depending on which type of dispute is under consid-
eration.
In the case of an alleged rule violation, the principal goal
of a dispute settlement system is to stop the violation. 7' Even
66. Phan van Phi, supra note 61, at 151.
67. For much of the 1970s and early 1980s, the EC was the most frequent re-
spondent in dispute settlement proceedings and aspects of some of its basic policies
(such as the Common Agricultural Policy) were under constant attack. More re-
cently, and probably in part in response to the increasingly protectionist legislation
emanating from the U.S. Congress, the EC has been a complainant more often than a
respondent. See infra note 124. It will be interesting to see whether any shifts in the
EC view of dispute settlement occur if the EC begins to have a greater interest in
having decisions favorable to itself implemented.
68. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII:2, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A64-A65, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, at 60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 268; supra note 8 (text of GATT art. XXIII:2).
69. Hudec, supra note 21, at 151-52.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
71. Van Hoof and De Vey Mestdagh list three basic functions for international
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if the dispute settlement system cannot compel compliance
with the rule, and even if compliance without compulsion is
unlikely, a lesser goal-such as achieving compliance with a
watered-down version of the rule-or a goal that ignores the
rule altogether would undermine the rule, and by implication
all other GATT rules. GATT rules would become meaning-
less. So as long as there are agreed-upon rules, their enforce-
ment must be the principal goal of the dispute settlement sys-
tem.72 This conclusion suggests that in determining whether
the GATT dispute settlement system should be more or less
"supervision," a term that encompasses dispute settlement systems: review, correc-
tion, and creation. Van Hoof & De Vey Mestdagh, Mechanisms of International Supervi-
sion, in SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 11-14
(P. van Dijk ed. 1984). In GATT, the dispute panel system performs the review and
correction functions in rule enforcement cases. The correction function is to achieve
compliance with the norms that have been found violated in the review function. The
dispute settlement system may play a creative function in non-rule-based disputes.
There are other goals that can be mentioned. For example, in addition to pro-
moting compliance, Jackson lists four others: promotion of friendly relations, pro-
tection of the interests of nonparties to the dispute, provision of objective decisions,
and a cheap means of resolving disputes. Jackson, GA TT as an Instrumentfor the Settle-
ment of Trade Disputes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 144, 153 (1967). These all seem subsidiary to the goal of promoting compliance
with GATT's provisions, although some would argue that the promotion of friendly
relations should take precedence. See infra note 72.
72. It would make sense to argue that a goal such as promotion of friendly rela-
tions among members should take precedence over achieving compliance with
GATT rules only if (a) the rules were not intended to be binding or (b) promotion of
friendly relations would be more effective in achieving compliance in the long run.
The latter contention is examined in the text accompanying infra notes 100-05. As to
the former, some have questioned whether the provisions of GATT were really in-
tended to be binding obligations. The EC and Japanese tend to view GAIT as estab-
lishing at most norms of aspiration (for a distinction between norms of obligation
and norms of aspiration, seeJ. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 760-62), in light of which the
parties to GATT are to negotiate settlements of trade disputes. ITC DISPUTE SETrLE-
MENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 68. This argument can be supported by the fact that
GAT[ is to this day applied only provisionally, see supra note 1, which can be inter-
preted to mean that no binding obligations were intended to be imposed. This argu-
ment is inconsistent with much of GATT history. The history of the dispute settle-
ment system demonstrates that from the very beginning, GATT members have com-
plained of other's noncompliance with GATT rules. A finding of such
noncompliance or by a panel was usually followed from compliance or continued
pressure by the contracting parties generally to comply.
In recent years, it is certainly true that compliance with certain of the rules has
been somewhat sporadic, but that does not change the parties' initial intent to be
bound by the rules. Should the system still attempt to enforce such rules? It would
seem that it should because to do otherwise would require a determination of which
rules are no longer agreed upon, an impossible task. If enforcement of a rule is truly
inappropriate, the party in violation should seek a waiver. This process would estab-
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adjudicative in nature, the issue is whether a more adjudicative
system would promote greater compliance with GATT rules.
In the case of non-rule-based disputes, the goal of a dis-
pute settlement system should be the promotion of a mutually
acceptable solution. 73 When a dispute does not involve the vi-
olation of a rule, the principal concern of the organization is
the promotion of harmony among its members, since the pres-
ervation of the integrity of the agreement that binds them to-
gether is not at issue. If a mutually acceptable solution cannot
be found, the best that can be done to promote friendly rela-
tions is for a neutral body, such as a dispute settlement panel,
to recommend a solution.
Since most GATT disputes deal with alleged rule viola-
tions, the following discussion focuses on the rule-enforce-
ment goal and the question of whether the adjudication model
or negotiation model would better achieve that goal. Where
appropriate, consideration will be given to non-rule-based dis-
putes.
2. Adjudication or Negotiation
One result of emphasizing adjudication in the GATT dis-
pute settlement system would likely be an increase in the
number of cases considered by panels. While an emphasis on
adjudication is not inconsistent with negotiated resolution of
trade disputes, participants believing that attempts at a negoti-
ated solution had failed would naturally request a dispute set-
tlement panel. The existence of this possibility means that
parties would probably abandon attempts at negotiated solu-
tions more quickly than under a system where negotiation was
the only alternative.74 Critics of the adjudication model argue
lish more concretely whether there is a consensus that enforcement of a particular
rule is inappropriate.
73. If no rule has been alleged to have been violated, rule enforcement cannot
be a goal. Considering the other goals of dispute settlement, see supra note 71, the
promotion of friendly relations is the goal that would be most appropriate. It would
be important to promote friendly relations in a manner that does not adversely affect
third parties, but so long as the existence of proceedings is public, third parties will
be able to monitor them and thus protect their interests.
74. it is not the case that emphasizing adjudication in GATT dispute settlement
would lead to the end of any attempts at negotiation. Because GATT cannot enforce
its decisions, ultimately the complaining party will not be able to obtain its principal
goal--compliance with the GATT rule in question-without some negotiation with
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that such increased use would poison the atmosphere within
the GATT system to the eventual detriment of all parties, and
that it could lead to the collapse of GATT, particularly if so-
called "wrong" cases are brought. Proponents argue that it
would increase overall compliance with GAIT rules to the
general benefit of all. These contentions are explored below.
a. Poisoning the Atmosphere
Critics of the adjudication model claim that it will promote
conflict and contentiousness in an organization that must pro-
mote negotiated solutions to achieve its goals.75 The need to
promote negotiated solutions is said to exist because even if a
panel report vindicates the complaining party, there is no
guarantee that the other party will correct its violation. Thus,
obtaining the other party's compliance with the violated GATT
rule will necessarily be the subject of negotiations as to the ex-
act form and timing of compliance. Since such diplomatic con-
tacts will almost always be required, the legalistic approach is
viewed as counterproductive because it poisons the atmos-
phere in which those contacts take place. Moreover, economic
relations between the contending parties may deteriorate gen-
erally as positions in the dispute harden and bad feelings spill
over into other areas.
It is difficult to analyze this criticism. Whether or not the
atmosphere between two parties has been poisoned cannot ob-
jectively be determined by examining tangible evidence. If the
atmosphere has been tainted, it is because one or both of the
parties has deemed it so. One can evaluate, however, some of
the reasons that are given as causes of a poisoned atmosphere.
First, it is suggested that the publicity associated with use
of the dispute settlement system will make it more difficult to
resolve the dispute.7 6 Publicity may embarrass the respondent
by publicly labeling it a wrongdoer, thereby causing it to be-
the respondent. A GATT ruling in the complainant's favor may shift the balance of
power in negotiations, but it does not obviate the need for negotiations.
75. G. MALINVERNI, LE REGLEMENT DES DIFFfRENDS DANS LES ORGANISATIONS IN-
TERNATIONALES EcONOMIQUES 131-32 (1974). See Hudec's summary of this argu-
ment in R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 25-26. Malinverni and Long argue that it is more
important to resolve the dispute than to pick a winner. G. MALINVERNI, supra, at 105-
06; 0. LONG, supra note 61, at 71.
76. G. MALINVERNI, supra note 75, at 118-19.
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come intransigent. To the extent that positions taken by the
parties become public, it becomes more difficult for them to
modify these positions without appearing to back down. This
situation impedes settlement of the dispute because neither
side wants to appear to lose. These arguments seem rather
weak because trade disputes are not secret. Even if they are
handled through negotiations, one side will argue publicly that
the other side has done something wrong. In addition, general
positions on the issues will usually become known, at least to
those who have an interest in the dispute."
Second, it is suggested that the filing of a complaint is a
contentious act in itself, which will worsen relations. 78  The
weight of this argument would seem to depend on how fre-
quently the dispute settlement system is used. If it is used only
infrequently and only a few parties ever lose, initiation of a
complaint would be something of a slap in the face. The igno-
miny of a loss would also loom larger. But to the extent that
there are many cases, and the major trading nations are both
winners and losers, this argument loses whatever force it had.
So long as the dispute settlement system is viewed as a mecha-
nism for resolving the myriad disputes, both major and minor,
that arise between ninety-odd countries on a reasonably regu-
lar basis, there should be no poisoning of the atmosphere. As
use grows, the system will be viewed as a normal part of the
relationships between countries.79
Third, it can be argued that a complaint will lead the re-
spondent in that case to bring an action against the original
complainant on other grounds."0 If this occurs, it will increase
the number of disputes the system must handle, but that in
77. This is particularly true in the United States where trade laws allow private
parties to petition the government to commence negotiations or GATT dispute set-
tlement proceedings in certain circumstances. See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411-2416 (West
1980 & Supp. 1987).
78. Hudec reports that the reaction to one case filed by the United States when
the system was not often used was "barely controlled outrage." R. HUDVEC, supra note
19, at 12 n.25.
79. In the Tokyo Round Understanding the parties expressly agreed that the
filing of a case was not to be considered a contentious act. 1979 Understanding,
supra note 20, 9.
80. For example, when the EC challenged the U.S. DISC tax provision, the
United States countered by challenging three European tax systems. The original EC
challenge may have been inspired by prior U.S. complaints against EC practices. R.
HUDEC, supra note 1, at 238.
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itself is not undesirable. Indeed, if more complaints lead to a
higher level of compliance with GATT rules, it would be bene-
ficial."a It could be argued, however, that more cases will re-
sult in more unresolved disputes, which could adversely affect
GATT's prestige.8 2 For example, an increase in the number of
disputes between two parties could make resolution of any one
dispute more difficult if its resolution is tied to resolution of all
of the others. While this may occur, it would occur in a system
emphasizing negotiation as well. In any event, the tying to-
gether of different issues is not necessarily a negative result.
Disputes that cannot be solved individually may be disposed of
as part of a global solution. By indicating which party is in the
right on the individual disputes, the dispute settlement system
can play an important role in pushing the ultimate global set-
tlement toward compliance with GATT rules. If the disputes
are left entirely to negotiations, it is less clear that there would
be any factor pushing the solution toward that suggested by
the GATT rules.8 "
All in all, the argument that an adjudicative system will
poison the atmosphere of GATT is not compelling. Moreover,
it is arguable that such a system will improve the atmosphere
of GATT. Emphasis on negotiation is likely to lead some
countries to use their relative political and economic strength
to take advantage of weaker countries, 4 a situation fundamen-
tally incompatible with a system that stresses rules. Rules tend
to treat everyone in the same fashion. Negotiated settlements
tend to favor the party with the best negotiating position,
which often will be the more economically powerful party.
This is probably why smaller countries often support a legalis-
81. The level of compliance with dispute settlement decisions is discussed infra
in the text accompanying notes 139-51.
82. As noted below, this danger, which is essentially a version of the "wrong
case" argument, does not seem great. See infra text accompanying notes 86-99.
83. For example, the United States and the EC recently were able to reach a
global solution in respect of several longstanding disputes involving EC preferences
for Mediterranean citrus products, U.S. quotas on semifinished steel and various ac-
tions and counteractions taken in connection with EC pasta subsidies. The solution
at least recognized the tenor of the panel reports. See infra note 203.
84. Malinverni, for example, recognizes that reliance on negotiations gives an
advantage to the stronger country to impose its will regardless of the merits of its
case. G. MALINVERNI, supra note 75, at 119. He believes the danger is less in the
framework of a multilateral organization although his argument seems mainly to be
that such an organization is aware of the problem. Id. at 120-23.
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tic system, as they perceive that they will be treated more fairly
under such a system. As such, it can be argued that an adjudi-
cative approach would improve the atmosphere of GATT by
stressing fairness."-
b. Wrong Cases
A second objection made to a legalistic system is that it
will result in what Professor Hudec has called "wrong" cases
being brought into the system.86 A wrong case is a dispute the
resolution of which undermines the GATT trading system.
Several kinds of wrong cases have been suggested. 7
First, there is the case where a country has, violated the
rules of the General Agreement, but has done so unavoidably.
Typically such violation would occur because of domestic pres-
sures that the government cannot ignore 8 It is argued that
condemning that government for violating the General Agree-
ment in such circumstances is both unfair and inappropriate.
It is considered unfair because the government is perceived to
have no choice but to do what it did. It is considered inappro-
priate because the domestic political pressures will prevent the
government from correcting the situation. 9
This sort of wrong case is not likely to damage GATT.
The argument that it will seems to be based on a criminal law
analogy. This analogy holds that an adverse decision by a dis-
pute settlement panel is wrong and unfair because such deci-
sion is tantamount to convicting the respondent of a criminal
act that it did not intend and could not prevent. This analogy
is, however, inappropriate. Even assuming that the respon-
dent really could not prevent the violation and did not intend
it, a violation occurred. Since the General Agreement contains
a negotiated balance of obligations, it is difficult to see why one
country that has upset that balance should be able to do so
without any offsetting penalty. While it might be inappropriate
to punish a government that was helpless to prevent the viola-
tion, it does seem appropriate to put pressure on the govern-
85. This argument is explored in Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal
Trade System, 12J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 98-101 (1978).
86. Hudec, supra note 21, at 159, 166.
87. See id. at 159-66.
88. Id. at 159.
89. Id.
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ment to correct the violation and, perhaps, to award relief to
those countries adversely affected by the violation. Surely
there is nothing unfair about such an outcome. Moreover,
such action is appropriate since it will likely promote compli-
ance with GATT rules. 90 In particular, it may help respon-
dent's government counteract domestic pressures if that gov-
ernment can honestly argue that condemnation by GATT is
likely and retaliation by trading partners is possible. To the
extent that such an argument is successful, compliance with
the General Agreement will be improved.9' In short, in some
cases noncompliance may be inevitable, but there would be
more compliance if GATT condemned rule violations than if
GATT ignored them.
The second example of a wrong case is one that is initiated
in respect of an issue on which the GATT community has
either not yet reached a consensus or on which past consensus
has broken down. In such a case it is unthinkable that both
parties will accept the panel's decision, whatever it may be.92
Examples of such cases would include those challenging agri-
cultural trade practices, such as those of the EC, the 1962 Uru-
guayan complaint against numerous developed country import
restrictions, and the U.S. complaint against EC tax systems in
the DISC case.93
Cases such as these undeniably put strains on the GATT
system. The panel reports may generate considerable contro-
versy, especially if they uphold the complainant's position.
Moreover, the strains endure in time, as these cases are likely
to remain unresolved for years. The critical point to remem-
ber, however, is that GATT has survived these wrong cases.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 100-05 for a discussion of compliance with
GATT rules.
91. R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 35-37.
92. See Hudec, supra note 21, at 160-66. Hudec differentiates between those
cases that attempt to enforce rules no longer representing consensus and those that
overtax the system by asking it to rule on cases where no consensus exists. In each
instance, the problem is a lack of a generally supported rule.
93. See, e.g., European Economic Community--Subsidies on Exports of Wheat Flour, 18
Int'l Trade Rep. Export Weekly (BNA) 899 (1983); European Economic Community-
Subsidies on Exports of Pasta, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. Import Weekly (BNA) 468 (1983);
GATT, Income Tax Practices Maintained by France, Belgium and the Netherlands,
BISD, supra note 1, at 114, 127, 137 (23d Supp. 1977); BISD, supra note 1, at 114
(28th Supp. 1982); GATT, Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, BISD, supra note 1,
at 95 (11 th Supp. 1963); BISD, supra note 1, at 35, 45 (13th Supp. 1965).
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Indeed, the United States and the EC have resolved a number
of agricultural disputes through GATT,94 and the Uruguayan
complaint, while not achieving what Uruguay sought, did lead
to some reduced import restrictions.9 5 Thus, the "wrong"
cases that GATT has faced so far might better be viewed as
difficult cases that may sorely test the system, but that do not
damage it.
What about the future possibility of wrong cases such as
these? An adjudicative model of dispute settlement allows par-
ties to push for interpretations of rules that are not commonly
agreed upon. This risk exists in any system, but in a legalistic
system it is more serious because the system guarantees that
the party pressing the claim can obtain a decision, whereas in a
system based on negotiated solutions the claim is never seri-
ously considered.9 6 But does guaranteeing consideration of
such claims undermine GATT? To begin with, it is quite pos-
sible that the panel will reject the controversial interpretation,
particularly if it is novel. Even if the claim is accepted, several
points are worth noting. First, the fact that it is accepted sug-
gests that there is some basis for it. Second, if all of the con-
tracting parties-or at least two-thirds of them-agreed that
compliance with the panel decision should not be required,
they could grant a waiver of the obligation at issue.97 Third, so
long as there is the possibility that the GATT Council must
approve a panel report, an outlandish complaint leading to an
unacceptable result seems remote.9" Nonetheless, it must be
94. See supra note 83.
95. See supra note 47.
96. It is noteworthy that Hudec rejects the idea that wrong cases should be
avoided by controlling access to the dispute settlement system. Hudec, supra note 21,
at 185.
97. The General Agreement permits its obligations to be waived in exceptional
circumstances on a two-thirds vote of the contracting parties. GATT, supra note 1,
Art. XXV:5, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A68-A69, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 64-65, 55 U.N.T.S.
188, 272-74.
98. Hudec suggests a number of techniques that can be used by panels to defuse
wrong cases. First, there can be increased use of mediation techniques and the par-
ties can be pressured to settle. Second, the panel can avoid rendering a specific deci-
sion or engage in creative interpretation of the obligation in question. Hudec, supra
note 21, at 185-97. It is questionable whether techniques such as avoidance or crea-
tivity should be stressed. As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 152-159,
because of certain perceived problems with the panel system, it is important to im-
prove the prestige and reputation of that system. Panels should decide the issues
presented to them rather than try to gauge the impact of their decision on the GAFT
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conceded that a profusion of wrong cases such as those men-
tioned above might weaken GATT.9
c. Compliance with GATT Rules
The principal argument in favor of a relatively more legal-
istic system is that it would better promote compliance with
GATT rules than would a negotiation/consensus system. 0 0
An adjudicative system would promote compliance with
GATT rules in two ways. First, it would discourage infractions
of GATT rules. To the extent that countries know that they
will be called to account if they violate the rules, they will be
less likely to do so because the perceived cost of a violation will
rise. In a more legalistic system the cost may include counter-
action that negates any benefits from violating the rules. Fur-
ther costs involve being labeled as a rule violator, a status that
in and of itself imposes some cost, particularly in future negoti-
ations over trade issues. Thus, to the extent that an adverse
system. After all, they are not a court of last resort. Only if the complaint is based on
nonviolation nullification and impairment would use of these techniques be appro-
priate. In such a case, the goal of the system is to promote an amicable resolution,
and creativity could undoubtedly contribute to this end. See text accompanying supra
note 73.
99. Wrong cases may also lead to wrong decisions by dispute settlement panels.
Hudec, supra note 21, at 166. The more disputes that are submitted to the panel
process and the more legalistic the system becomes, the more likely that there will be
occasions, as there are in all judicial systems, when cases will be wrongly decided.
Wrongly decided, that is, in the eyes of the majority of the GATT community. This
problem is not unique to a relatively legalistic system. In fact, incorrect results may
be a more common outcome of negotiations. While negotiated decisions may well
always be viewed as correct by the parties involved, they may be wrong in the sense
that they are not accepted by other GATT parties or that they are patently inconsis-
tent with GATT rules. See G. MALINVERNI, supra note 75, at 121 n.27. In any event,
wrong decisions do not pose a threat as long as, one, the Council retains some con-
trol over the adoption of panel decisions, and two, they can be minimized by proce-
dural improvements in the dispute settlement system, such as using more exper-
ienced panels. See infra text accompanying note 218.
100. The positive role of rules in shaping conduct by nations has been noted by
many authorities. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979); Hudec,
GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE
L.J. 1299, 1315-25 (1971); Jackson, supra note 38, at 25-28.
A more legalistic, rule-oriented system would also be, and be perceived as, a
fairer system. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. In addition, to the extent
that the parties knew that the GAIT rules as written would be enforced, they would
have an incentive to keep those rules up-to-date. This would make GATT a more
vital institution and would reduce pressures to avoid use of the dispute settlement
system such as existed in the 1960s and 1970s. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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dispute panel decision is anticipated, countries will hesitate to
violate the rules.' 0t Indeed, domestic political pressures may
be directed elsewhere when the government can make a case
against noncompliance with GATT. °2 By contrast, in a nego-
tiation/consensus system, the only cost may be unpleasant dip-
lomatic exchanges, a negligible cost compared to the domestic
political and economic benefits obtained by violating the rules.
Second, to the extent that an adjudicative approach pro-
duces more panel decisions, compliance with GATT rules will
improve simply because panel decisions tend to be imple-
mented, if not immediately, then over time.' 0 3 In general
there has been an excellent, though admittedly at times slow,
record of compliance with dispute settlement decisions that
have been adopted by the Council. So long as most decisions
are respected, adherence to the rules under a legalistic system
will be better than in a negotiation/consensus system. °4
101. See R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 28-29. Hudec notes that the existence of
credible and adjudicative procedures makes negotiations over rule violations more
likely to succeed. If rules are not recognized as binding, there is no reference point
for negotiators and negotiations are likely to fail as more and more extraneous points
are raised.
102. See supra text accompanying note 91. The U.S. Manufacturing Clause case
is an example of how a GATT decision may influence the type of legislation that a
domestic interest group seeks. The case involved a U.S. law that denied copyright
protection in some instances to works of U.S. citizens that were printed abroad. The
law was scheduled to expire in 1982, but was extended for four years by Congress
over the President's veto. The extension was found to violate the General Agree-
ment. GATT, U.S. Manufacturing Clause, BISD, supra note 1, at 74 (31st Supp.
1985). U.S. industry tried to have the law extended again in 1986, but in a modified,
less protectionist form. When asked why, an industry representative replied that they
had reduced their goals because of "enormous pressure from elements of the Gov-
ernment and elements of the Congress." Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copy-
rights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1822 and S. 1938, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 172 (1986) (testimony of Arthur C. Prine, Jr.). That pressure came
from government officials arguing that the GATT decision should be respected and
industries fearful of retaliation by those countries that would be adversely affected by
the extension of the clause.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 139-51.
104. Defenders of the antilegalistic position dispute this. They contend that if
governments are told that certain long-cherished practices are no longer considered
acceptable or that rules demanded by a powerful domestic constituency cannot be
implemented, they may well respond by ignoring GATT altogether. A negotia-
tion/consensus system, it is argued, recognizes these constraints on governments
and does not push them too far. As a consequence, it obtains the maximum compli-
ance with GATT rules that can be achieved and does so in a way that does not cause
offense and poison the atmosphere so as to affect future negotiations. (This argu-
ment is summarized in R. HtDEC, supra note 19, at 25-26.) In essence, it is the same
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Furthermore, even if one party initially refuses to comply
with a dispute settlement decision, that decision will affect the
relative negotiating positions of the two contending parties.
At the very least, the loser will suffer embarrassment. More-
over, that nation will have to justify its noncompliance with the
panel decision. Such noncompliance, having been sanctioned,
must be dealt with in other areas which are the subject of nego-
tiations. In these other areas, as well as in negotiations directly
on the subject matter of the dispute, the winner will gain lever-
age from having its position vindicated by the panel report.10 5
Thus, all other things being equal, it is likely that compli-
ance with panel decisions will be increased and adherence to
GATT rules better served by a more legalistic system. With an
increase in the number of decisions, the obligations of GATT
members will become clearer and better defined. Thus, the in-
creased compliance with GATT rules will be compliance with
more precisely defined rules.
3. Conclusion
In comparing the adjudication and negotiation ap-
proaches and considering the arguments advanced in favor of
each, the fundamental difference between them becomes more
evident. A relatively more legalistic approach puts more pres-
sure on the GAIT dispute settlement system and on GATT
itself. Thus, the fundamental question arises: is the GATT
system too fragile to handle the pressures that a more legalistic
approach to dispute settlement would place on it? To answer
this question, a review of GATT's history and current status is
necessary.
GATT dispute settlement was probably more legalistic
during its first decade. 10 6 However, this early experience is not
entirely relevant to the present day's. In its early years, GATT
was much smaller and more homogenous and was run
predominantly by those who had drafted the agreement. 107
Today, GATT is a much larger, more diverse organization, and
there is no longer anyone who "knows" what was intended
as the poison-the-atmosphere and wrong-case arguments rejected earlier. See supra
text accompanying notes 75-99.
105. See supra text accompanying note 83.
106. Hudec, supra note 21, at 151-52.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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when a particular provision was drafted. Thus, the experience
of GATT's early years is probably not relevant to GATT today;
at best it provides evidence that a more legalistic system has
operated without endangering the GATT system.
During the middle years of GATT's history, dispute settle-
ment was more akin to the consensus/negotiation model. Dur-
ing that period GATT may well have been too fragile an organ-
ization to withstand the additional pressures of a more legalis-
tic dispute settlement system. During this period, the U.S.
Congress was often ill-disposed toward GATT,'0 8 and there
was much uncertainty over how the formation of the European
Economic Community would affect GATT. 0 9 In those years it
was not so unthinkable that GATT could collapse-or more
likely gradually fade from the scene-particularly if the United
States and the EEC (and laterJapan) decided to deal with trade
matters outside its framework."10
Of course, GATT did not collapse or fade away, and it is
arguably less likely to do so now than at any time in its history.
After almost forty years of existence, GAT now has a perma-
nency it once lacked for at least three reasons. First, in its early
years GATT was very much dependent on the individuals who
had created it."' The individuals who drafted GATT are by
and large no longer living, and GATF today draws its strength
from its institutional nature.
Second, GATT's supremacy in trade matters is more se-
cure than ever. Prior to the Tokyo Round, questions were
raised as to whether GATF was the appropriate negotiating
forum for certain trade issues. In particular, since some provi-
sions of the General Agreement were deemed to require
changing (or at least amplifying) and the possibility of amend-
ing them seemed remote, it was thought that another forum
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment ("OECD"), composed mainly of developed western
108. As late as 1974, in the Trade Act of that year, Congress provided that its
authorization of funding for the U.S. share of GATT expenses "does not imply ap-
proval or disapproval by the Congress of all articles of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade." 19 U.S.C. § 2131(d) (1982).
109. R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 195-97.
110. R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 22.
111. Many of these individuals had been involved in negotiating trade issues
since the 1930s. R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 187-88.
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economies, would be appropriate to manage world trade.' 2 A
similar debate ensued before the commencement of the Uru-
guay Round in respect of whether trade-in-services issues
should be negotiated in GATT, the OECD, or UNCTAD. 
3
The Tokyo Round codes demonstrated, however, that it was
not necessary to amend the General Agreement to update it,
and a similar approach is being used in the Uruguay Round.
While GATT has largely lost the field of commodity agree-
ments to UNCTAD, this loss is not very significant." 4 At the
moment GATT seems to be the unchallenged forum for trade
negotiations.
Third, GATT's members, and especially the United
States, have to a certain extent conformed their domestic laws
to GATT's requirements. After the completion of the Tokyo
Round, many provisions of U.S. trade laws were rewritten in
response to the Tokyo Round codes, thus bringing many
"grandfathered" U.S. laws into compliance with GATT for the
first time." 5 More importantly, in proposing and adopting
trade legislation in the U.S. Congress, it is now much more
common to provide for GATT consistency or authorize the
President to compensate other parties for GATT violations
than it was in the past." l 6 This trend is true in other countries
as well." 7 To the extent that GAIT rules and procedures be-
112. The Tokyo Round Government Procurement was based on work done in
the OECD. GATT, supra note 3, at 76. The OECD was also the forum for study of
other trade problems. See, e.g., OECD, POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS (THE REV REPORT) (1972).
113. See Gibbs, Continuing the International Debate on Services, 19J. WORLD TRADE
L. 199, 214-18 (1985); Schott, Protectionist Threat to Trade and Investment in Services, 6
WORLD ECON. 195, 212-13 (1982).
114. UNCTAD has approved an Integrated Program for Commodities, under
which agreements are negotiated in respect of food, agricultural raw materials and
minerals. These agreements have generally not been very successful. See, e.g., Mar-
kets Test Commodity Agreements'Ability to Meet Objectives of Price Stabilization, IMF SURVEY,
Dec. 10, 1984, at 370. As a consequence, GATT may have benefitted by not having
been tagged with their failure.
115. For example, the U.S. system for customs valuation was conformed to the
Customs Valuation Agreement, 19 U.S.C. § 1401a (1982), and a material injury test
was added to the U.S. countervailing duty statute. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)(A) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
116. See 19 U.S.C. § 2133 (1982); S. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 304(b)(3)(A), 306 (1987).
117. See, e.g., Regulation No. 2641/84; arts. 1-2, Eur. Comm. OJ. No. L 252, at
1 (1984).
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come institutionalized on a national level, GATT's position in-
ternationally is solidified.It"
Thus, the GATT system is now much stronger than it was
at times in the past. Consequently, it is much less likely that
wrong cases would damage GATT in the future, especially
since GATT survived such cases in the 1960s and early 1970s
when it was a weaker institution. Thus, to the extent that the
major drawback of a more legalistic dispute settlement system
is the wrong case problem, that problem is becoming less sig-
nificant. Because of the advantages of such a system, it is ap-
propriate for GATT to move toward a legalistic dispute settle-
ment system. GATT would be much more adversely affected
by a general failure of its rules to be implemented than by an
occasional refusal to implement a decision.
C. Operational Criticisms
In addition to raising philosophical questions about the
proper emphasis of the GATT dispute settlement system, its
critics have also pointed to problems in the way it operates.
Among the major problems cited are (1) the fact that some na-
tions, especially the smaller ones, do not use the system;
(2) delays in processing complaints; (3) failure to implement
effectively panel decisions; (4) various defects in the panel pro-
cess, such as poorly written decisions and bias; and (5) an in-
ability to respond adequately to developing country com-
plaints.
1. Lack of Use
One of the major criticisms leveled against the GATT dis-
pute settlement system prior to the Tokyo Round was that it
was irrelevant because few nations, except occasionally the
United States, made use of it. 1" 9 Since the conclusion of the
Tokyo Round in 1979, there has been a burgeoning of busi-
ness for the dispute settlement system. Depending on how
one counts disputes, there have been from five to seven dis-
putes processed in the system per year. 20 Thus, nearly half of
118. R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 86.
119. See supra note 49.
120. A private GAIT compilation suggests a slightly different number of dis-
putes.
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the cases filed in GATT's forty-year history have been brought
in the short decade since the Tokyo Round. If only those dis-
putes that lead to panel reports are considered, the conclusion
is the same; that is, of the fifty-two panel reports issued in Arti-
cle XXIII disputes, and the five under the Tokyo Round agree-
ments, as of the end of 1986, '21 twenty-four (over forty per-
cent) were issued from 1980 through 1986. Indeed, in the
early summer of 1987, there were eight panels deliberating. '
22
The problem of nonuse or desuetude is no more.1 23
The related criticism that only the United States was using
the system, and that other countries, whether developed or de-
veloping, had abandoned it, is also no longer true. Since 1979
the United States has in fact been the major complainant, but it
is closely followed by the EC. Canada has also made extensive
use of the system. Although use by other countries has been
sporadic, Hong Kong, Chile, Australia, Nicaragua, Finland,
South Africa, India, and Brazil have all invoked the system at
least once independently and a number of countries have
jointly invoked it on one occasion. 124 The complaints have
largely been directed at the EC, the United States, Japan, and
121. GATT Focus, No. 46, at 2 (May 1987).
122. Letter to -author from E.-U. Petersmann, GATT Office of Legal Affairs
Uune 16, 1987).
123. The cause of this increased use is not clear. The Tokyo Round did not
work significant changes in the dispute settlement system, although the fact that
much attention was focused on the system probably made parties more aware of its
existence, which may have led some to try it. Additionally, as the United States
started using the system more, other countries may have felt that they should too, if
only to make sure that the United States had experience as a defendant and was put
into a position of having to comply with adverse decisions. In any event, use of the
dispute settlement mechanism in recent years has certainly been a more normal part
of trade relations than it was a decade ago.
124. The ITC study shows that the following countries made multiple com-
plaints between 1979 and 1985: United States (11); Canada (6); EC (6); Hong Kong
(2). ITC DISPUTE SETrLEMENT STUDY, supra note,25, at 1-19 to 1-28. Since the cut-off
date of the ITC study, frequent use of the dispute settlement system has continued
and the EC has initiated at least three complaints against the United States that have
been submitted to panels. The cases involve the U.S.-Japanese semiconductor trade
agreement, the U.S. Customs users fee, and a U.S. tax on imported oil. 4 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 192 (1987); GATT Focus, Nos. 44 & 46 (Mar. & May 1987). The EC's
willingness to continue to make greater use of the system, and its general willingness
to participate in the system, may depend on the results of its complaints, and particu-
larly those in which it prevails. If effective implementation is not achieved, one can
visualize the EC denouncing the adjudicative aspects of the system as inherently un-
sound.
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Canada, although Norway, Spain, New Zealand, and Finland
have also been respondents.1 5 Thus, it would seem that the
system has been tested by a wide variety of countries and that
cases regularly involve the four largest western trading coun-
tries-the United States, the European Community, Canada,
and Japan.126 Frequent use by the largest trading countries
suggests that they now have greater confidence in the system.
The increased volume of GATT dispute settlement cases
has put to rest the argument that expanded use would over-
load the system and lead to its collapse because of a shortage
of people available to serve on panels. 2 7 The fact that the EC
is often involved in disputes means that officials of small EC
states, often viewed as well-informed, neutral GATT experts,
are often no longer available to serve on panels. Nonetheless,
in general panels have been formed expeditiously to hear the
relatively numerous disputes that GAIT has processed in re-
cent years.' 28 Moreover, because a wide variety of individuals
has served on panels, no countries have borne a significantly
disproportionate share of panel work.' 29
2. Delays
One of the primary complaints about the GATT dispute
settlement system has been the supposedly excessive amount
of time that it takes to process disputes. 30 Delays have been of
125. The ITC study shows the following countries have been respondents in
more than one complaint between 1979 and 1985: EC (12); United States (8);Japan
(5); Canada (3); Spain (2). ITC DispuTE SETrLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 1-19 to
1-28.
126. Japan has yet to initiate a complaint, although it recently asked for formal
consultations (the first step in the dispute settlement process) with the United States
in respect of the U.S.-Japanese dispute over trade in semiconductors. GATT Focus,
No. 48, at 1 (July-Aug. 1987).
127. See Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Dispute Settlement, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 129, 135 (1980) (remarks of Thomas R.
Graham); id. at 141 (remarks of Michael Gadbaw).
128. As demonstrated below, the significant delays associated with dispute set-
tlement in recent years have occurred after completion of the panel's work. See infra
text following note 138.
129. In the twenty panel reports published by GATT in the BISD supplements
from 1979 to 1986, fifty-seven different individuals filled the sixty-two panel posi-
tions. In the eleven reports published from 1979 to 1982 involving three-person
panels, eighteen countries were represented on the panels, with only individuals
from Switzerland(6), Sweden (4) and Finland (3) serving more than twice.
130. ITC DIsPUTE SETrLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 71.
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three sorts: delays in appointing a panel, delays in the panel's
consideration of a case, and delays caused by the failure of the
Council to adopt panel reports. The DISC case is a prime ex-
ample: It took almost three years to agree on the composition
of a panel and the Council did not adopt the panel's report for
another five years.131
Inordinate delay in processing disputes, however, has not
been a major problem in most recent cases. Since the Tokyo
Round, it has been been rare for more than eighteen months
to elapse between the date of a complaint and the date that the
relevant panel report is adopted.3 2 Indeed, the GATT pro-
cess has been completed in less than about two years in virtu-
ally all cases, except those involving U.S.-EC agricultural dis-
putes.' Furthermore, the time has been diminished since the
131. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57. The DISC case presented unu-
sual, perhaps unique problems. It was the first case where outside experts were in-
cluded on a panel and it involved a sort of counterclaim to the initial complaint,
which the United States insisted should be considered by the same panel as the EC
complaint. See generally Jackson, supra note 54, at 762-63.
132. It is difficult to judge the exact length of time between the date of a com-
plaint and the adoption of a panel report by the Council because the precise date on
which a complaint was made is not always clear. According to the dates used in a
private GATT compilation of disputes, more than eighteen months elapsed between
the date of the complaint and the adoption of the panel report by the Council in the
following cases: GATF, United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna
Products from Canada, BISD, supra note 1, at 91 (29th Supp. 1983) (25 months);
GATT, United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, BISD,
supra note 1, at 107 (30th Supp. 1984) (20 months); GAT, United States Manufac-
turing Clause, BISD, supra note 1, at 74 (31st Supp. 1985) (20 months); GATT, Can-
ada-Administration of Foreign Investment Review Act, BISD, supra note 1, at 140
(30th Supp. 1984) (23 months). In addition, two years elapsed between the U.S.
complaint against Spanish restrictions on sale of soybean oil and the decision of the
Council to "note" the report, Int'l Trade Rep. Export Weekly (BNA), No. 382, at 154
(Nov. 10, 1981), and at least nineteen months elapsed between the South African
complaint against Canadian provincial taxes on gold and discussion of the panel re-
port in the Council. See GAT Focus, No. 38, at 2 (Feb.-Mar. 1986). The latter case
was settled. Id. Under the Government Procurement Code, almost two years
elapsed between a U.S. complaint on EC practices and the adoption of the panel
report by the Committee on Government Procurement. GAT, Panel On Value-
Added Tax and Threshold, BISD, supra note 1, at 247 (31st Supp. 1985); see also ITC
Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 25, at 1-24.
133. In cases involving U.S. challenges to EC production subsidies for canned
fruit and EC preferences for Mediterranean citrus fruit, the panel reports in favor of
the United States were not adopted, although settlements were reached 47 and 52
months, respectively, after the dates of the complaints. GATT Focus, No. 38, at I
(Feb.-Mar. 1986); 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1316 (1986).
Dispute settlement under the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code is the major excep-
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1982 Ministerial Declaration, which stresses the need for
prompt processing of disputes. 34 In the past five years, an av-
erage of a little more than twelve months has elapsed between
the Council decision to appoint a panel and a Council decision
to adopt the panel's report. 3 5 The work of the panels them-
selves has typically taken only about six months. 3 6 Indeed, as
of this writing the most recent adoption of a panel report took
,place only four and one-half months after the decision was
made to appoint a panel. 37 Given the speed at which court
-litigation proceeds in most countries, this is not a bad rec-
ord. 38 Indeed, it is a very good one.
To the extent that delays have occurred in recent years,
the most serious ones have resulted largely from the right of a
losing party to block adoption of the panel report by the
GATT Council.
3. Implementation of Decisions
Another of the principal criticisms leveled at the GATT
dispute settlement system has been that it has been unsuccess-
ful in ultimately resolving disputes because panel decisions
may never be adopted, and, even if adopted, are not effectively
implemented.' 3 9 There are three instances when the GATT
dispute settlement system can be said to have failed: first,
where the panel report is adopted, but the recommendations
are not implemented; second, where the panel report is not
adopted, and the recommendations are not implemented; and
tion to an assertion that delays have been significantly reduced. Although panel re-
ports were issued in 1983 in respect of EC export subsidies on wheat flour (no viola-
tion found) and pasta (violation found) and in 1985 in respect of a provision of the
U.S. 1984 Trade and Tariff Act, no panel reports under the Code have been adopted
by the code committee. GATT Focus, No. 46, at 2 (May 1987); see BISD, supra note
1, at 161-62 (32d Supp. 1986); 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 584 (1986).
134. 1982 Declaration, supra note 17, at 13-16. The Declaration stressed the
need to follow the targets of the 1979 Understanding on Dispute Settlement, which
provided that panels should normally be constituted within thirty days of the decision
to establish them and that the panel should normally report without undue delay and
within three months in urgent cases. See 1979 Understanding, supra note 20, 11,
20.
135. GATT Focus, No. 46, at 2 (May 1987).
136. Id.
137. 4 Int'l Trade Rep. Current Reports (BNA) 192, 814 (1987) (U.S. tax on
imported oil).
138. See infra text accompanying note 197.
139. ITC DIspUTE SETrLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 71-72.
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third, where the panel report is not adopted, but the recom-
mendations are implemented. Whether this last instance
should be considered a failure is discussed below.
At the outset, it must be conceded that it is difficult to
evaluate the GATT dispute settlement system's performance
because it is not always easy to determine objectively whether a
dispute has been successfully resolved. Since complainants
often seek initially more than they would happily accept, suc-
cess cannot be judged on whether one party obtained com-
plete vindication of its initial position, or even obtained all that
was recommended in a panel report. It is more useful to try to
determine if the contending parties have accepted a certain
outcome as resolving the dispute.' 40
The application of this criterion to cases where the Coun-
cil adopted the dispute settlement panel's report leads to the
conclusion that the GATT dispute settlement system has
worked quite well. According to a GATT Secretariat analysis
of the results of the fifty-two cases processed under the Gen-
eral Agreement that have led to the issuance of panel reports,
all but two findings of violations have led to compliance or set-
tlement. 14' In some cases, considerable time has elapsed be-
140. To consider whether the parties ultimately reached a satisfactory adjust-
ment of their dispute is not to argue that the focus of the GATT dispute settlement
system should necessarily be to facilitate negotiated settlements of disputes. The
adjudicatory process by which one party's position is determined to be the correct
interpretation of the General Agreement can play an important role in what sort of
settlement the parties reach. The prevailing party in the dispute settlement system
will have a stronger argument that its position should prevail in any negotiated settle-
ment.
141. GATT Focus, No. 46, at 2 (May 1987). The GATT Secretariat may take a
somewhat broader view of when settlements are successfully reached than other ob-
servers. The ITC study found that in twenty-five of sixty-three (40%) of cases where
a panel decision favored complainant, the offending practices were terminated; and
that in twenty-nine cases (45%) the practices were changed in part or a settlement
was reached. In one case retaliation was authorized; in five cases no action was taken
to correct the practice. ITC DISPUTE SETrLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 62. In two
of the five cases, the panel reports were later implemented when the U.S. manufac-
turing clause expired in 1986 and when the EC changed its practices in valuing con-
tracts for purposes of the Government Procurement Code. As to the other three
cases, two involved EC sugar subsidies where the panels arguably did not find sub-
stantive violations (except for a failure to consult, see GATT, EEC Refunds on Ex-
ports of Sugar, BISD, supra note 1, at 290 (26th Supp. 1980); BISD, supra note 1, at
69 (27th Supp. 1980)) and one involved U.S. measures affecting Nicaraguan sugar
quotas, which the U.S. indicated were part of a broader political dispute and not a
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tween the panel decision and compliance or settlement. 42
Nonetheless, it is extremely important to bear in mind when
considering proposals for change that the current system has
usually produced successful results.
When the Council does not adopt the panel report, the
system seems to fail. It is important to note, however, that the
failure to adopt the report does not mean that the dispute is
not ultimately successfully resolved. The loser in the panel
proceeding may have been the complainant. 4 3 In other cases,
the dispute may have been settled-in some cases promptly, 44
in other cases only after the passage of several years.' 45 To the
extent that a settlement is eventually reached between the par-
ties, the system can be considered to have worked. Even if a
rather long delay ensues before settlement, settlement is still
achieved.' 46 The failure of the Council to adopt reports in
these cases, however, undermines the system because it de-
prives the panel report of any precedential effect.' 47
The case where the report is not adopted after a complain-
ant has prevailed and no settlement is reached represents a
clear failure of the dispute settlement system. In fact, few of
these cases have arisen, particularly because over time disputes
have been settled. Particularly problematic since the Tokyo
Round has been the failure of the Subsidies Code Committee
to adopt reports and the failure of the parties to settle the
cases. However, of the three reports that have not been
adopted, one involved a loss by the complainant (U.S. com-
plaint against EC subsidization of flour exports), 14 one was
eventually settled (successful U.S. complaint against EC subsi-
dies on pasta exports),' 49 and one was eventually rendered
subject for settlement in GATT. See GATT, U.S. Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua,
BISD, supra note 1, at 72 (31st Supp. 1985).
142. See, e.g., supra note 137.
143. For example, the United States, as complainant, did not prevail in the
Spanish soybean case, see Int'l Trade Rep. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 382, at 154
(Nov. 10, 1981), and the EC Wheat Flour export subsidies case. See 18 Int'l Trade
Rep. Export Weekly (BNA) 899 (1983).
144. This was true of the South African complaint against Canadian provincial
taxes. See supra note 135.
145. See supra note 137.
146. See supra text accompanying note 45.
147. See infra text accompanying note 195.
148. See supra note 143.
149. See infra note 205.
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moot by the expiration of the legislation challenged (successful
EC complaint against U.S. definition of wine industry in U.S.
countervailing duty law).' 50 Although the GATT dispute set-
tlement system did not remove the underlying dispute in these
cases, it did influence the outcome of negotiations in the Pasta
case. Thus, the system was not a total failure. Of course, even
if it does not preclude the eventual settlement of the dispute,
lack of adoption of a panel report does slow down that settle-
ment. The fact that settlements are usually reached raises the
question whether automatic adoption of panel reports would
encourage quicker settlements.' 5
4. Problems of the Panel Process
A number of specific complaints have been raised about
the operation and status of dispute settlement panels: a lack of
distinction, questionable neutrality, and poorly crafted reports.
These criticisms are at least in part well founded.
First, as we have seen, panels are usually composed of per-
sons with limited or no prior panel experience.' 52 This prob-
lem is magnified when, as is often the case, the dispute involves
the United States and the EC, and panelists by necessity must
*be drawn from smaller countries. It has been questioned
whether such persons have the necessary stature to render a
decision that will be respected. 53 While the advice and assist-
ance of GATT officials may steer panels clear of major mis-
takes, it is inevitable that a decision by a panel drawn from
smaller countries and with little, if any, prior dispute settle-
ment experience will not be as respected as a decision by a
panel of three internationally-recognized experts.
Second, questions have been raised about the neutrality of
panel members. '1 4 For the panel system to work, panelists
must have some knowledge of GATT. Since use of govern-
150. Section 612(a)(1) of 1984 Trade and Tariff Act expired on September 30,
1986. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 626(c)(2), 98 Stat. 2048,
3042-43 (1984).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 190-92.
152. See supra note 129.
153. See, e.g., R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 48-49.
154. See Jackson, supra note 60, at 6.
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mental panelists is preferred, 55 panels inevitably consist of
government officials in the trade area. No matter how hard
such panelists try to be impartial, there is always the possibility
that they will be influenced in their decision by consideration
of how it may influence their own personal future in their
country's diplomatic service. Indeed, unconfirmed folklore
suggests that a country with an interest in a dispute once re-
minded a panelist that his decision could affect his career. In
any event, even if such pressures never occur and even if pan-
elists are truly neutral, there will always be concern about the
possibility of bias. As such, the system may not have the ap-
pearance of impartiality, and this image will undermine respect
for its decisions.
Third, in respect of the panels' work, it is suggested that
they often do not produce clear decisions to serve as precedent
for the GATT community. 156 Two related problems are in-
volved here. First, it is true that panels have sometimes at-
tempted to avoid difficult decisions and obfuscation is obvi-
ously one means of doing so. Indeed, some commentators
have encouraged panels to act in this manner.157 Second, it is
true that the status of a panel decision in GATT is unclear.'
Although panel decisions do occasionally cite prior panel deci-
sions as support, 159 there is no general acceptance in GATT of
the notion that a panel decision constitutes a binding prece-
dent to be followed in future cases. If the goal of the dispute
settlement system is to promote compliance with GATT rules,
however, it is clear that panel decisions would more effectively
achieve that goal if they were clear and if they were understood
to represent GATT law as it will be applied in similar cases in
the future.
5. The Position of Developing Countries
Developing countries have only seldom made use of the
dispute settlement system, even though special rules exist that
155. GATT, Decision on Dispute Settlement Procedures, BISD, supra note 1, at
9-10 (31st Supp. 1984).
156. ITC DISPuTE SETTLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 72.
157. As noted above, such an approach is undesirable. See supra note 98.
158. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 60, at 7.
159. See, e.g., GATT, U.S. Manufacturing Clause, BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 88
(3 1st Supp. 1985).
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are designed to make it easier for them to do so.160 In large
part, this seems to be a consequence of their belief that the
system is, at best, designed to deal with disputes between the
major developed countries. It is thought to be futile for them
to invoke the system because GATT will not give a sympathetic
ear to their claims (as demonstrated by the Uruguayan case in
the 1960s)16' and that even if they win their case they will not
have the diplomatic or economic muscle to ensure that the de-
cision is implemented (as demonstrated by the U.S. refusal to
implement several successful findings against the United States
by smaller countries). 6 2
6. Conclusion
A number of problems exist with the GATT dispute settle-
ment system. The principal problems are delay (and particu-
larly the right of a party to block adoption of a decision), a
failure of some decisions to be implemented (including some
in favor of smaller countries), and a number of specific proce-
dural or operational problems. The next section considers re-
forms that would reduce or eliminate these concerns.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The principal goal of reforming the GATT dispute settle-
ment system must be to improve overall compliance with
GATT rules. 163 This goal can be accomplished by adopting
features that would make the system more legalistic.164 While
a more legalistic system will probably increase the number of
disputes brought to the system,' 65 such result would be desira-
ble. Greater use will make recourse to the system seem nor-
mal, thereby reducing concerns about poisoning the atmos-
160. See 1979 Understanding, supra note 20, 7; GATT, Procedures under Arti-
cle XXIII, BISD, supra note 1, at 18 (14th Supp. 1966).
161. See supra note 47.
162. ITC DISPUTE SETrLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 71. The United States
did not change its agricultural quotas despite some attempt at retaliation by the
Netherlands. See R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 165-82. More recently, the United States
ignored an adverse panel decision concerning U.S. restrictions on sugar imports
from Nicaragua. GATT, U.S. Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, BISD, supra note 1,
at 67 (3 1st Supp. 1985).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
165. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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phere in which GAT'T operates. 66 In addition, more rulings
will increase the corpus of GATT law and result in more de-
tailed rules, both of which will lead to increased overall com-
pliance with GAIT rules.167
This section will consider changes to the system that will
address the criticisms and problems discussed in the foregoing
section in a way that emphasizes adjudication in dispute settle-
ment. Three major reforms are proposed. First, to reduce de-
lays, panel reports should normally be adopted automatically,
absent certain special circumstances. Second, the GATT sys-
tem should not hesitate to authorize (and thereby regulate) the
use of retaliatory actions to encourage implementation of
GATT decisions. Finally, a number of procedural improve-
ments should be made in the way the panel process operates.
In particular, panelists should be drawn exclusively from a lim-
ited roster, or so-called superpanel, of GATT experts.' 68
A. Reducing Delays: Changing the Rule on Consensus
Three elements to the problem of delays were previously
identified: delays in the establishment of panels, delays in
panel consideration of cases, and delays in adoption of panel
reports. 169
1. Panel Establishment
Turning first to the problem of panel establishment, de-
lays may occur because a complainant does not have a right to
have a panel appointed and because the appointment process
itself may be lengthy. 70 Two reasons can be advanced for not
automatically appointing panels when a complaint is made:
first, the desire to see the dispute resolved amicably; and sec-
ond, the wish to prevent wrong cases from entering the sys-
tem. To respond to the former concern, it is necessary to bal-
166. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
168. These proposals will be contrasted as appropriate with other proposals to
reform the system, particularly those made by Professors Jackson and Hudec and by
the U.S. government. See R. HUDEC, supra note 19; Bliss, GATT Dispute Settlement Re-
form in the Uruguay Round, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 31, 51-52 (1987) (summary of U.S.
government proposals); Jackson, supra note 60.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 130-38.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
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ance GATT's interest in promoting friendly relations and the
complainant's interest in having its complaint heard. As to the
latter point, we have already noted that it is inappropriate to
handle the wrong case problem by controlling access to the
system.' 7 1
The basic issue is: how long should the complainant be
required to seek a negotiated settlement? By the terms of Arti-
cle XXIII, the complainant will already have entered negotia-
tions with the respondent before making its complaint.17 2 The
filing of the complaint indicates that those negotiations have
failed and that the complainant is serious, and suggests that it
may be time to try another approach to resolve the dispute.
Providing for automatic establishment of panels would not be
a major change since panels are virtually always appointed
now.17 3 Moreover, this is the rule under the Tokyo Round
Codes and has not in itself caused problems.' 74 Nonetheless,
to avoid unnecessary panel proceedings, it would be useful to
allow the respondent one last chance to settle. This can be
accomplished by requiring that one Council meeting intervene
between the filing of the c~mplaint and the appointment of the
panel. If no settlement is reached in that period, the interest in
promoting amicable settlements has been satisfied and there is
no reason not to establish a panel. The desire to promote ne-
gotiated -solutions should not be stressed so strongly that the
dispute settlement system is not used.
A second type of delay in the panel establishment process
occasionally arises when panels are not promptly consti-
tuted.' 75 As discussed below, it would be desirable for GATT
to adopt a system whereby panelists are selected from a
superpanel.17 6 If such a change is implemented, any delay in
171. See supra note 96.
172. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII:1, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A64, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, at 60, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 266-68.
1,73. Although this change seems minor, it was a contentious issue in the Tokyo
Round. GATT, supra note 3, at 105. Most proposals for reform would provide auto-
matic access. See R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 71-75; Jackson, supra note 60, at 16.
174. This conclusion might be challenged because of the unsatisfactory experi-
ence of dispute settlement under the Subsidies Code. See supra note 137. However,
the problems under that Code stem mainly from definitional uncertainties. GATT
Focus, No. 46, at 2 (May 1987).
175. The DISC case is the classic example. See supra text accompanying note
131.
176. See infra text accompanying notes 217-2 1.
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panel selection could be minimized. Since the amount of delay
occasioned by slowness in the establishment of panels is not
great, these changes would have only a minor effect on reduc-
ing delays in the average case, but they would eliminate
problems that arise from time to time.
2. Panel Deliberation
Delay may also arise in panel consideration and decision
of cases.' 77 The major source of delay is footdragging by one
party in providing information or otherwise participating in
-the procedure. 78 To solve this problem, panels should be au-
thorized to go forward on the basis of the best information
available.' 79 This power should be exercised cautiously, as de-
cisions based on incomplete information will be suspect, even
if the respondent is the cause of the problem. 80 Its existence,
however, will likely improve cooperation by the parties.
In order to speed up panel deliberations, general goals for
prompt consideration of cases should be established.
Although it has become very fashionable in U.S. trade law to
specify time limits for almost every sort of decision,"8 the va-
rying complexity of international trade disputes means that
setting specific deadlines for various stages of a proceeding is
unrealistic. 8 2  Many GATT disputes involve more difficult
177. See supra note 136.
178. ITC DisPuTE SETrLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 71.
179. GATT recognizes that this is an appropriate response in antidumping and
countervailing duty cases. GATT, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, art.
6:8, BISD, spra note 1, at 171 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, art. 11:9, id. at 56.
180. See R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 74-75. Hudec opposes such a rule for this
reason. Not to give the panel this power, however, would allow a party to cripple the
system, and that is a greater threat in the long run.
181. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671a-1671e, 1673a-1673b, 1673d-1673e (West
1980 & Supp. 1987); 50 U.S.C. App. § 2409 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 926 (1987) (EC External Affairs Commissioner De Clercq: "Amer-
icans love deadlines, they just adore them.").
182. U.S. proposals for revising the GATT dispute settlement procedures would
establish such deadlines. See Bliss, supra note 168, at 51. Moreover, failure to meet
deadlines would be a justification for some form of retaliation. Although retaliation
may be a useful tool in resolving a dispute once the decision has been made as to
which party is in the right, retaliation at earlier stages of the process would be prema-
ture and could truly poison the atmosphere and exacerbate trade problems by pro-
moting conflict over arguably extraneous issues. Given that major problems of delay
do not occur at this stage, this proposal seems unnecessary as well as risky. Recog-
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problems than U.S. trade law cases, which often concern only
the evaluation of statistical evidence to calculate dumping mar-
gins or subsidies or to determine injury issues. While these
evaluations may sometimes be difficult, they are largely
mechanical processes that are routinely repeated by an admin-
istrative agency. Disputes in GATT are much more likely to be
sui generis. As such, establishing specific deadlines will likely
lead only to more failures to meet the deadlines. However,
parties should be encouraged, even pressured, not to be ob-
structive. Use of experienced panelists, as suggested below, 8 3
would probably make panel procedures on the whole more ef-
ficient than they are at present.
3. Blockage
The third form of delay results when parties (usually the
losing party, but sometimes joined by others) block adoption
of a panel report by the GATT Council. 184 This situation is
possible because GAIT has traditionally operated by consen-
sus, even though the General Agreement establishes a one-na-
tion/one-vote system.'185 Thus, if the losing party prevents for-
mation of a consensus, the report is not adopted and has no
effect.' 8 6 GATT has recognized that this problem is a serious
one: Under the 1982 Ministerial Declaration it is suggested
that outright obstructionism for no reason might not be
viewed as acceptable.18 7 Unfortunately, so long as a country
offers some excuse-such as a need to explore further the pos-
sibility of a negotiated solution to the dispute-the lack of con-
sensus is accepted as blocking adoption of a panel report.
Before considering means of addressing this problem,
however, it is useful to consider how the right of blockage
might be justified. Two reasons can be advanced for allowing
blockage. One is that it is wrong or at least counterproductive
to label one side a loser over its objections. This is essentially
nizing the panel's right to use the best available information would better solve the
problem of uncooperative parties.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 217-21.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 143-151.
185. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXV:3, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A68, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
at 64, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 272; see supra note 35.
186. 1982 Declaration, supra note 17, (x).
187. Id.
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a reprise of the argument, previously rejected, that the GATT
dispute settlement system should be based on negotiation
rather than adjudication.18 8
Second, it is asserted that blockage is an appropriate right
because it is the responsibility of the contracting parties to in-
terpret the General Agreement, and absent consensus
(GATT's traditional method of decision-making) the con-
tracting parties cannot act. While it is true that the ultimate
responsibility for interpretation of the General Agreement
rests with the contracting parties, 8 9 this argument over-simpli-
fies matters because it does not adequately consider the role of
panels in dispute settlement. Essentially the contracting par-
ties have delegated their responsibility for dispute settlement
to the panel system. As a consequence of this delegation, it is
reasonable to contend that the panel's decision should be pre-
sumed to be the decision of the contracting parties, and that
the party opposed to the decision should bear the onus of
showing that it should not be adopted. Thus, it would make
more sense for a decision to be deemed adopted unless there
is some special reason for requiring consensus for adoption of
the report.'9 0
Such a procedure would obviously be a change from the
present practice, but it is not a fundamental attack on the use
of consensus for decision-making in GATT. The rule being
interpreted by the panel would have been adopted by consen-
sus, the dispute settlement system itself would have been
adopted by consensus, and, assuming the use of a superpanel,
the body from which the panel was drawn would have been
chosen by consensus. Since dispute settlement was initially
delegated to the panel process because the contracting parties
as a group were not deemed well suited to engage in dispute
settlement,' 9 ' it seems inappropriate to allow them to take
control of a dispute at the very end of the panel process.
In addition to solving the problem of delay caused by
blockage, such a change would remove the appearance of bias
188. See supra text accompanying notes 106-18.
189. This conclusion is mandated by the wording of Article XXIII. See supra
note 8.
190. It would also be inappropriate to deem a report adopted it a majority of the
contracting parties opposed adoption.
191. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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inherent in a system where a party is indirectly a judge of its
own conduct. Making the system appear to be fairer in this
manner would be particularly valuable to the extent that do-
mestic interest groups must be persuaded to accept the results
of the system. As long as the right of blockage exists, those
groups will urge their governments to avoid use of the system,
or, if their position loses, they will want their government to
exercise the right. Either way, GATT suffers.
There is, however, one instance where automatic adoption
of panel reports should be considered inappropriate. While
panels should not interpret the General Agreement so freely as
to impose obligations where none existed before,' 92 it is possi-
ble that they may do so, or at least may be perceived as having
done so by some contracting parties. Since a panel under the
dispute settlement system does not represent all parties to
GATT, if the panel in fact imposes a new obligation, it should
be implemented only if there is a consensus. This case must be
distinguished from nonviolation cases, where it is understood
that panels are not imposing obligations, but are only recom-
mending solutions to disputes.
The obvious problem is determining who decides whether
the decision interprets an existing obligation or imposes a new
one. The solution lies in presuming that a superpanel report is
deemed adopted after consideration at two Council meetings
without objection. That presumption would not apply if the
superpanel voted that a new obligation had been imposed, or,
that for some other reason (such as the decision was unex-
pected or novel or even wrong), adoption should be by con-
sensus. To ensure that the interests of GATT as a whole
would be considered in the decision, it should be provided that
(i) the superpanel for such decisions would include the Direc-
tor-General and/or one or two other GATT officials (for exam-
ple, the chairman of the contracting parties) and (ii) that less
than a majority (for example, 4 of 12) could rule that adoption
of the decision would be only by consensus.
This proposal would eliminate blockage except in .cases
where new obligations have been imposed or where there is a
strong feeling that adoption should not take place absent con-
sensus. In those cases, to allow blockage does not seem inap-
192. 1982 Declaration, supra note 17, (x).
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propriate. Since one of the principal causes of delay is block-
age, solving the blockage problem would largely solve the de-
lay problem.'93 In addition, this proposal provides a
reasonable procedure for submitting to consensus those cases
that are too controversial. It is also realistic in that it does not
place an undue burden on the losing party. No new obligation
is being imposed on the losing party. The party still retains
control over whether and how it will respond to the decision.
The only change is that it will no longer be able to pretend that
it did not lose when negotiations are held on the question as to
how the decision will be implemented. Nor would GATT as a
whole lose control of disputes. If a decision were perceived by
many as wrong, adoption by consensus would presumably be
required by the superpanel. Moreover, if for some reason the
superpanel did not require adoption by consensus, two thirds
of the contracting parties could grant a waiver or a majority
could vote not to adopt the report.
This proposal would have two additional advantages.
First, because the panel's decision would be reviewed by the
superpanel, the proposal establishes an appellate review pro-
cess of sorts. 94 The precise scope of review would have to be
defined since frequent "appeals" should be discouraged. In
addition, the superpanel could consider the correctness of a
panel decision in ruling on whether the panel report would be
automatically adopted. Second, this proposal would largely
eliminate the practice whereby some panel reports are simply
"noted" or otherwise consigned to limbo.' 95 Even if the un-
derlying dispute is resolved, the failure to adopt the panel re-
port technically deprives the GATT system of useful prece-
dents. Assuming the superpanel does not rule that consensus
is needed for adoption, all reports should be adopted.
This proposal would work a significant change in GATT
procedures. An alternative proposal that is more modest
would be for the contracting parties to decide that consensus
for purposes of adopting a panel decision would not include
the two disputing parties. 196 It is questionable whether this
193. Even if the Council decision was stayed for referral to the contracting par-
ties, a poll could be taken promptly.
194. Jackson, supra note 60, at 7-8.
195. See supra cases cited in notes 143-44.
196. The United States has made this proposal. See Bliss, supra note 168, at 51.
1987]
98 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:51
proposal would reduce blockage. Presumably any major
power could persuade a stalking horse to present its position.
Moreover, it will often be the case that other parties will have
an interest in the outcome as great as the disputant's. Thus,
this proposal is unlikely to work absent an amount of good
faith that would be sufficient to make the present system work.
In summary, under the procedure as outlined above there
would be little delay in the adoption of panel reports. After a
conciliation period, a party could file a complaint prior to a
GATT Council meeting. The respondent would be expected
to respond at the next Council meeting, normally a month or
so later. If the response was inadequate in that the dispute
continued, a panel would be appointed. If the superpanel pro-
posal is adopted, the panel could easily be constituted and es-
tablish its work program in the following month. Allowing the
parties three months to present their arguments in writing and
orally would probably suffice in most cases, and another month
or two would suffice for the panel to draft its decision and re-
ceive the parties' comments. Absent a superpanel decision to
the contrary, the report would be automatically adopted at the
second Council meeting. Thus, most cases could be resolved
in six or seven months after a complaint was filed. Even the
most determined footdragging would not lead to the typical
case lasting for more than one year.
Is this fast enough? In the United States, the typical fed-
eral appellate case takes about 10 months, not counting the
possibility of applying for certiorari.1 97 Since the GATT panel
must engage in fact finding, as well as in considering the par-
ties' arguments, it is eminently reasonable to allow it a year or
so to process a dispute.
B. Implementation of Decisions: Use of Retaliation
Most disputes are settled once the panel report has been
adopted. 98 Nonetheless, not all disputes are settled and some
are settled with less than full compliance with the panel deci-
sion.' 99 It is therefore appropriate to consider ways to im-
197. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 123 (1985).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
199. See supra note 141.
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prove implementation of panel recommendations.
As a first step, GATT needs to monitor implementation of
recommendations. Information about a party's implementa-
tion is not now generally available.2 °0 It would be appropriate
to require a losing party to report regularly to the Council on
the status of its implementation of the panel recommendation.
This obligation may lead to more peer pressure to comply and
is consistent with early GATT practice.21
Two other methods might also improve implementation:
first, the more frequent authorization of retaliation; and sec-
ond, the use of sanctions. Historically, GATT has not author-
ized retaliation, with one ancient exception.20 2 Retaliation is,
of course, completely antiethical to the antilegalist position.
Nonetheless, retaliation occurs, and it is arguably helpful in
resolving otherwise intractable disputes. It is therefore appro-
priate to consider how retaliation might be used in the GATT
dispute settlement system.
Retaliation heightens the intensity of a dispute. As such it
should be authorized only after serious review of the status of
noncompliance. Generally, retaliation would not be appropri-
ate unless some time had passed and the panel recommenda-
tions had not been accepted. It would be difficult to fix a gen-
eral time limit, but panels could indicate in each case when
they would consider an application for authority to retaliate.
That time might vary, for example, depending on whether im-
plementation required legislative approval or could be imple-
mented by executive action, or whether the case involved a
rule violation or a non-rule-based claim of nullification and im-
pairment. 0 3
Would more frequent authorization of retaliation be desir-
able? In GATT's early years, retaliation was rare and seldom
200. ITC DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT STUDY, supra note 25, at 72.
201. See R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 186.
202. See GATT, Netherlands Measures of Suspension of. Obligations to the
United States, BISD, supra note 1, at 32, 62 (1st Supp. 1953).
203. Retaliation authorized by a panel should not need to be reviewed by the
Council, although it could be treated as a new panel report. Implicit in adoption of a
report should be recognition of the possibility that retaliation may be authorized. In
non-rule-based cases, retaliation should probably be used more sparingly, but should
still be available. Because the panel's decision in those cases essentially holds that
the respondent's actions should be redressed, it is appropriate to pressure the re-
spondent to take such action.
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serious. It has been on the upswing in recent years.
Although done without GATT authorization, it has often oc-
curred in connection with GATT-related disputes between the
United States and the EC, particularly those where panel deci-
sions have not been adopted. In these cases, it has had some
positive results in leading to negotiated settlements. For ex-
ample, it has led to settlements of the EC-U.S. disputes over
steel import controls, citrus preferences, pasta export subsi-
dies and Spanish-Portuguese accession to the EC, as well as
improved adherence by the Japanese to the U.S.-Japanese
trade agreement on semiconductor trade.2 °5
The basic reason why retaliation can work is that a trade
dispute typically involves a GATT-violating provision that af-
fords.some advantage to a domestic industry. So long as that
industry is pushing hard against implementing an adverse deci-
sion, and no other domestic constituency is arguing the con-
trary position, government officials may not be politically able
to implement the decision, even if they wish to do so. Once
retaliation occurs, however, another domestic constituency will
consider its interests harmed by the failure to resolve the dis-
204. As of 1977, Hudec noted six cases of non-GATT authorized retaliation. R.
HUDEC, supra note 19, at 82-83. With one possible exception, Hudec characterizes
the retaliation as symbolic in nature. Id.
205. For example, on November 1, 1985, the United States increased tariffs on
pasta. 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1389 (1985). The EC retaliated by raising tariffs on
U.S. walnuts and lemons. In August 1986 a compromise was reached which involved
a settlement of the citrus preferences and semifinished steel disputes, and also in-
cluded the EC removing restrictions on U.S. walnuts and lemons in return for the
tariff on pasta being removed. As part of the settlement, it was agreed that there
would be further negotiations aimed at settling the issue of export refunds on pasta
byJuly 1, 1987. 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1024 (1986). A settlement was ultimately
achieved. 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1004 (1987).
In the Spain-Portugal accession case, the United States and EC threatened to
impose tariffs. See, e.g., Proclamation 5601 of January 21, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 2663
(1987). The dispute was settled without actual implementation of retaliatory meas-
ures when the EC guaranteed that Spain and Portugal would continue to import cer-
tain minimum quantities of farm products over the next four years and agreed to
lower tariffs on a variety of other agricultural and chemical products. See 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 122 (1987).
In the semiconductor case, following claims that Japan had not lived up to
Agreement on Semiconductor Trade with Japan, the United States imposed 100%
duties on certain Japanese computers, television sets, and power tools in retaliation.
Proclamation No. 5631 of April 17, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,412 (1987). The duties on
television sets were later removed because of increased Japanese compliance with the
Agreement.
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pute. If the other country has carefully targeted its retaliation,
that constituency will be a relatively powerful one, such that
there will be considerable pressure placed on the government
to resolve the trade dispute. Since the domestic pressures will
to some degree be offsetting, it will be easier to act contrary to
the interest defending the condemned practice.2 °6
Counterretaliation is clearly contrary to the General
Agreement, but it is possible (perhaps even likely) if the U.S.-
EC experience is a guide. °7 Now, of course, neither retalia-
tion nor counterretaliation is authorized. If, however, GATT
were to authorize retaliation but not counterretaliation, then
parties might be hesitant to counterretaliate. Even if the par-
ties did counterretaliate, this would not offer relief from pres-
sure from the initial victim of the retaliation. Relief from pres-
sure could be attained if some countervailing benefit were of-
fered. However, such concessions would be very difficult
where the target for retaliation has been carefully selected.
Thus, retaliation will have the beneficial effect of increasing
pressures for settlement. As we have seen, settlements negoti-
ated after a panel decision tend to incorporate the panel's find-
ings in the settlement agreement. 208 Thus, authorizing retalia-
tion will tend to increase GATT compliance overall.
Authorization of retaliation would represent a clear
change in recent GATT policy. Those opposing a more legal-
istic model because it supposedly poisons the GAT atmos-
phere would vehemently oppose increased authorization of re-
taliation, because retaliation is obviously more contentious
than making a complaint. Nonetheless, there are good reasons
why GATT should authorize retaliation more regularly. First,
the novelty of retaliation will decrease with use and it will even-
tually be accepted as the normal consequence of an inability to
resolve a dispute. This will lessen the poisonous effects that
retaliation entails. 0 9 Second, retaliation would improve the
efficiency of the GATT dispute settlement system by encourag-
206. The decision not to extend the U.S. Manufacturing Clause is an example of
this. See supra note 102.
207. See supra note 205.
208. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. In the instances cited in note
205 supra, the settlements were in the direction of enforcing panel decisions and pre-
viously negotiated agreements.
209. Cf. supra text accompanying note 78.
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ing speedy conflict resolution. Third, retaliation is fair be-
cause it reestablishes the balance of concessions between the
two parties, a balance that is thrown into disequilibrium when
one party has violated GATT's rules. Fourth, and most impor-
tant, retaliation will often occur anyway if disputes are not re-
solved. Given that this is the case, it would be desirable for
GATT to exercise greater control over retaliation when it oc-
curs. Indeed, it is possible that retaliation will become more
common, in the future, because of its proven effectiveness in
recent U.S.-EC trade disputes.21 ° With GATT supervision
some control can be exercised, particularly as to the amount of
retaliation, which reduces the likelihood that a massive trade
war would erupt.
In the past, retaliation was authorized only once and was
considered to have been ineffective. This was because it in-
volved a small country (the Netherlands) retaliating against a
very large one (the United States). 21 Retaliation will probably
continue to be ineffective in such cases, but that does.snot mean
that it will not work in cases where the disputing parties are
roughly equivalent in size, particularly if they are also relatively
large as in the case of the U.S., the EC, and Japan. Retaliation
should be authorized where it may work. The U.S.-Nether-
lands case does raise the question, however, of how GATT can
better enforce decisions obtained by a small country against a
larger one.21 2 One possible solution would be to allow smaller
nations "excess" retaliation. This would not be inconsistent
with the terms of Article XXIII, 213 but it is probable that even
massive retaliation by a small country would be unnoticed by a
larger one.
To make retaliation against large countries effective,
should GATT authorize other parties to retaliate in such cir-
cumstances, i.e., should there be sanctions placed on larger
countries? Or should any country be sanctioned that fails to
210. See supra note 205. In addition, threats of retaliation seem to have played a
role in the recent EC decision not to adopt an oils and fats tax harmful to U.S. agri-
cultural exports. See 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 866 (1987).
211. See Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United
States, BISD, supra note I, at 32, 62 (1st Supp. 1953).
212. Retaliation may also be ineffective where both disputants are relatively
small countries since there may be relatively little trade that occurs between them.
213. See supra note 8. Article XXIII allows for "appropriate" retaliation.
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implement a panel decision?2 4 Realistically, use of sanctions
may offer the only hope of ensuring that the dispute settlement
system works for smaller country complaints against larger
countries, and not surprisingly, it has been proposed by
smaller countries. 2 5 Nonetheless, it would probably be un-
wise to adopt such a policy because it would generalize trade
conflicts. Retaliation may be inevitable between the actual dis-
putants, thus suggesting that GATT should recognize and at-
tempt to channel it. Moreover, only the actual disputants are
involved and they can always resolve their dispute at any time.
Sanctions go beyond that and put GATT in the position of
promoting conflicts between parties that had no conflict. In
addition, sanctions probably would not work against a major
power unless they were massive and applied by other major
powers. Involving major powers in such a conflict would seem
unwise.21 6 Moreover, the use of sanctions is probably inappro-
priate in a system concerned with maintaining a balance of
concessions. This leaves the smaller countries to rely on the
good faith of the larger countries, a not particularly satisfac-
tory solution, but perhaps the best that can be expected.
Generally speaking, dispute panel decisions have been im-
plemented. GATT's record in this regard could be improved,
however, by more frequent authorization and control of retali-
atory measures, at least when major powers are involved.
C. Procedural Improvements: Establishing a Superpanel
A number of valid criticisms have been made in respect of
the panel system: panels may have insufficient stature to
render decisions that will be accepted by the major powers;
panelists may not be neutral because they are typically diplo-
mats with careers to keep in mind; panel decisions are some-
times not well written and fail to address the relevant issues
forthrightly; and there is a shortage of acceptable persons will-
ing to serve on panels.21 7
These problems could all be largely eliminated if panelists
214. It is not clear that Article XXIII currently allows this. See R. HUDEC, supra
note 19, at 84 n.140; supra note 8.
215. See supra note 65.
216. R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 85.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 127, 152-59.
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were selected from a small group of experts chosen in ad-
vance. 2 8 This group or superpanel, as I have referred to it,
could be limited to 10 or so generally-accepted GATT legal
experts. The effect of this selectivity would be to heighten the
panel's status, resulting in greater respect for its decisions. Be-
cause the group would stand ready to hear all cases, the prob-
lem of staffing panels would disappear. Since the panelists
would have more experience in the panel process, one would
expect them to write better decisions and address the issues
more directly. Solving the problem of neutrality, of course,
depends on how the superpanel is selected, which is the most
difficult question.
To reduce the neutrality problem, it would be desirable to
appoint nongovernmental experts as well as governmental
trade officials who have retired from active service. Could such
people be found? Certainly over the years as interest in trade
matters has increased, there has been a significant increase in
those knowledgeable about GATT and its rules and traditions.
Thus, it is likely that a sufficient number of qualified panelists
could be found in academia. However, a superpanel com-
posed exclusively of academics would probably not be ac-
cepted. In addition, the number of retired trade officials of
sufficient stature who would be interested and acceptable may
be limited. An alternative source would be the secondment of
current trade officials knowledgeable in GATT affairs. This
would not solve the problem of career-consciousness affecting
decisions, although the problem could be reduced if the panel-
ist were appointed for several years and therefore were in-
volved in a number of decisions. A mixture of trade officials,
retirees, and academics would seem a reasonably acceptable
way to staff such a panel.
To ensure an experienced superpanel, members would be
appointed for staggered terms of three or four years, subject to
reappointment. To reduce potential bias or the appearance of
favoritism, a panelist who had been an official of a particular
country should probably be disqualified from hearing disputes
involving that country, at least until a number of years has
218. This proposal or variations of it are commonly suggested as a useful reform
of GATT procedures. See, e.g., R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 50-51; Bliss, supra note
168, at 51;Jackson, supra note 60, at 18-20.
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passed since the panelist's last government service. In addi-
tion, each disputant (or each side if there are multiple com-
plainants) should be allowed to strike one or two panelists.
This would make the proposal more palatable to those con-
tracting parties desiring more control over panel selection
than merely selecting the superpanel. The Director-General
could then appoint the panel or it could be chosen by lot from
the remaining members of the superpanel. Random selection
would probably be preferable so as to isolate the Director-
General from charges of favoritism.
Is it conceivable that' the contracting parties would agree
to use a superpanel? In some ways the proposals seem rela-
tively limited in scope. The GATT Secretariat already com-
piles lists of potential panelists.2 '9 The interests of the con-
tracting parties are protected through the right to be involved
in the selection of the superpanel and the right to strike
superpanel members in constituting specific panels. There
would be one major difference, however. As we have seen,
panel membership has been quite diverse.22 ° Putting dispute
settlement in the hands of the small group on the superpanel
would work some change in this respect. Moreover, the pres-
tige of the panel decisions would probably be considerably en-
hanced since every decision would be a product of this elite
group. Panel decisions would be viewed as precedents since
they would indicate the views of those likely to be on future
panels. 22 ' This would have the beneficial effect of making
GATT rules more precise. Thus, although using a superpanel
can be characterized as a change only in the panel selection
process, it would in fact make the GATT dispute settlement
system significantly more adjudicative in nature, a desirable
consequence.
D. Other Reforms
A number of other reforms have been proposed. First, it
219. GATT, Action by Contracting Parties on Dispute Settlement Procedures,
BISD, supra note 1, at 9-10 (3 1st Supp. 1985).
220. See supra note 129.
22 1. While prior decisions may sometimes be treated as precedents now, see, e.g.,
GATT, U.S. Manufacturing Clause, BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 88 (31st Supp. 1985),
the exact status of panel decisions is unclear, a situation that has been criticized as
undesirable. ITC DISPUTE SETrrLEMENT SrUDY, supra note 25, at 72.
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is sometimes suggested that increased use should be made of
conciliation or mediation. 22 This is certainly a good idea,
although care must be taken so that these mechanisms are not
used as a means of delay. To be effective they must be struc-
tured, and probably should be conducted under the auspices
of the Director-General.22 3 To the extent that legal issues are
involved, the Office of Legal Affairs could issue advisory opin-
ions. 22 4 Mediation should be viewed, however, as an initial
process that may obviate the need for formal dispute settle-
ment procedures. It should not be viewed as a substitute.
A second, often-proposed reform is to create two tiers of
obligations: one subject to strict dispute settlement proce-
dures; the other to current procedures.225 In other words, the
provisions of GATT would be divided into those that the par-
ties agree should be strictly enforced and those that are simply
goals that need not be followed or enforced. The proposal is
made to render reform of the dispute settlement more palat-
able. Since enforcement of obligations that are no longer
widely respected is considered to be a major fear of the con-
tracting parties, this alternative would allow them to choose
affirmatively those that were to be enforced. The two-tier pro-
posal was first made prior to the Tokyo Round when there was
much dissatisfaction with GATT dispute settlement proce-
dures and a feeling that consensus had broken down on many
issues.226 The past decade of more successful dispute settle-
ment and the improved consensus that resulted from the To-
222. See, e.g., Bliss, supra note 168, at 51;Jackson, supra note 60, at 15-16.
223. While the Director-General needs to be perceived as neutral by the parties,
he may be the only person with sufficient prestige to make mediation effective. If it is
thought that acting as a mediator would impede his other functions, mediation could
be handled by another high ranking official charged with that function. At present,
panels are encouraged to promote settlements. 1979 Understanding, supra note 20,
at 16. This probably interferes with their need to render detached decisions. Can the
GATT Resolve International Trade Disputes?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 287, 291 (1983) (remarks ofJohn H. Jackson).
224. These views would not be definitive since it would not be appropriate to
bind dispute settlement panels to the views of the staff. Nonetheless, since the Office
of Legal Affairs plays an important role in advising dispute settlement panels now
and would continue to do so, their views would be quite authoritative. Thus, parties
could informally seek the views of the Office, which when given might well lead to an
amicable settlement.
225. See, e.g., R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 53-54;J.JACKSON, supra note 1, at 784-
85; Bliss, supra note 168, at 51.
226. See supra note 225.
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kyo Round and hopefully will result from the Uruguay Round
may make the proposal less attractive than it once was.
In any event, the proposal seems fatally flawed. Those
GATT obligations not made subject to strict enforcement
would be ignored, even though many GATT members contin-
ued to believe in their validity. Indeed, it is likely that very few
rules would be accorded this higher status, so most GATT
rules would effectively cease to exist. 2 7 This is a high price to
pay. Even with stricter dispute settlement procedures, there is
still no guarantee that panel decisions will be implemented.
Thus, the potential gains are relatively limited given the risk of
gutting GATT.
Third, it has been suggested that the GATT dispute settle-
ment system adopt aspects of a so-called surveillance model.228
The surveillance model refers to the dispute settlement mecha-
nism of the Multifiber Arrangement ("MFA"), which estab-
lishes a Textiles Surveillance Body ("TSB") that is charged
with reviewing certain actions taken by MFA parties to restrict
textile and apparel imports.22 9  Although the TSB has no
power to force changes in these actions, it was viewed in the
mid-1970s as having been generally successful in keeping MFA
parties from deviating too much from their obligations.23
More recent analysis suggests that the TSB has not been all
that successful.2 3 ' In any event, it is not clear how a surveil-
lance model would be appropriate for much of GATT dispute
settlement. The major difference between the GATT dispute
227. Hudec notes this possibility. See R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 54. The expe-
rience of the International Court of Justice may be analogous. Given a choice, few
countries have accepted unlimited compulsory jurisdiction. See H. STEINER & D.
VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 234 (3d ed. 1986).
228. This model is discussed in R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 62-69, 78-81. An-
other alternative sometimes considered is a prosecutorial model of dispute settle-
ment. The model would eliminate the need for a complainant, thereby perhaps re-
ducing the confrontational aspect of dispute settlement. The decision of what com-
plaints to pursue, however, would have to be invested in somebody, presumably in
the GATT Secretariat, and would reduce its ability to act as a mediator. The useful-
ness of this model is questionable. If no one is willing to bring a complaint, it is
doubtful that a serious violation is occurring. See generally id. at 76-77.
229. See generally R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 62-65; Perlow, The Multilateral Super-
vision of International Trade. Has the Textiles Experiment Worked?, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 93
(1981).
230. R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 65.
231. Perlow, supra note 229, at 130-31.
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settlement system and the TSB is that certain actions are re-
quired to be reported to the TSB. Thus, it is a question of how
disputes come into the system for review. It would probably
be unrealistic to think that governments would or could mean-
ingfully agree to report all measures that might affect interna-
tional trade for review, or even all those that might involve
GATT issues. It is conceivable that future codes, especially a
safeguards code, would establish a surveillance system for
specified actions, but that could be handled by the superpanel
proposed above. Members of the superpanel could simply be
assigned to the surveillance function for certain periods of
time. Probably the most important lesson to be learned from
the TSB experience is that it was perceived to have been rela-
tively successful, given the lack of any enforcement powers,
and it was generally held in high regard, in large part because
of its expertise.2 2 This suggests that a superpanel could en-
hance the prestige of the GATT panel process.
CONCLUSION
Two points need to be stressed in conclusion. First, much
of the dissatisfaction with the GATT dispute settlement system
stems from its failure to resolve satisfactorily specific disputes.
Those disputes often involve rules that are no longer generally
accepted by the GATT community. No dispute settlement sys-
tem will solve the problem of outdated rules, although the re-
forms suggested here, particularly those concerning adoption
of panel reports and use of retaliation, may speed resolution of
such disputes. But in the end, the best way to ensure that
countries comply with GATT rules is to ensure that the rules
generally represent the views of the parties. Realistically, there
will be little chance that the proposed reforms will be adopted
so long as some GATT members believe that GATT rules are
outdated. The Uruguay Round will hopefully help to reinforce
a consensus on GATT's rules.
Second, it must be remembered that GATT is an interna-
tional organization whose members can repudiate it at any
time. It is therefore important not to place unreasonable
strains upon the organization in implementing a more legalis-
tic dispute settlement system. At the same time, it is just as
232. R. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 65.
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important to remember that GATT can be damaged as much
by failing to enforce its rules as by too strictly following them.
Because GATT is no longer the fragile organization it once
was, it should not shrink from enforcing its rules more rigor-
ously.233
The recent, increased use of the GATT dispute settlement
system is likely to continue in the future, especially as U.S.
trade laws will continue to encourage its use by the United
States. It is therefore critical that the system be strengthened
so that increased use does not lead to a breakdown of the
GATT system. The principal goal of dispute settlement is to
ensure compliance with GATT rules. Adoption of the reforms
suggested herein would create a more legalistic system that
would more efficiently process disputes and achieve that
goal.23 4
233. Experience in federal systems, such as the United States and the EC, indi-
cates that court decisions directed against members who view themselves as sover-
eign and direct them to comply with federal law do not lead to the collapse of the
organization, even if those decisions take some years to implement.
234. Although this Article has focused on Article XXIII procedures, it would be
appropriate for these changes to be embodied in an understanding applicable to all
GATT dispute settlement. Although some Tokyo Round codes have more detailed
provisions on dispute settlement and stricter time limits, they have worked no better
than Article XXIII procedures. Indeed, the Subsidies Code is viewed as having the
strictest procedures but its dispute settlement experience has not been at all success-
ful. See supra note 133. Nothing would be lost by standardizing procedures. The one
exception would be to continue those provisions authorizing the appointment of
technical experts.
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